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Bismillahirrahmanirrahim 
Allahumma salli wasallim `ala Saiyyidina Muhamad wa `ala ālihi wasahbihi 
 
 
The Recent Crisis:  
Lessons for Islamic Finance 
 
Abbas Mirakhor and Noureddine Krichene* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The current view defines financial crisis as the collapse 
of the financial asset market. It is said to be triggered 
when asset markets no longer validate expectations of 
continuously rising returns on financial assets. Invariably, 
financial crises have involved the banking systems. 
Signs of the crisis are said to be: (a) large economic 
imbalances, particularly significant current account 
deficits; (b) asset price inflation; (c) rising leverage; and 
(d) slowing pace of economic growth. The consequences 
of financial crisis are considered to be: (a) a large 
reduction in income and employment; (b) a substantial 
rise in the growth of public debt; and (c) a prolonged 
period of recovery (Eichengreen and Mitchener, (2003); 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). There is now a consensus 
that the current global financial crisis was triggered by 
the collapse of asset prices in the sub-prime mortgage 
sector of the US financial sector, which then became the 
epicentre of the global crisis. For this reason, analysis of 
the crisis has to start with the financial structure of the 
latter system and the conditions that led to the crisis.  
 
Two explanations of the crisis have emerged. a 
conventional explanation and an alternative one. The 
first sees the emergence of the crisis as a consequence 
of large global macroeconomic imbalances that led to 
large savings by the emerging markets. This was itself a 
                                           
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance of their 
colleague Ms. Aida Hidayah. 
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consequence of the financial crises of 1997–2000 in the 
emerging markets that prompted these countries to 
emphasise exports and motivated the accumulation of 
large primary surpluses. The resulting savings were 
accumulated as large central bank reserves, which were 
then invested in government bonds issued by industrial 
country governments, especially the United States. In 
turn, this led to low medium- to long-term interest rates, 
a large expansion of credit and debt, and rapid 
expansion of substantially large liquidity in a ferocious 
search for yield. The latter led to an aggressive incentive 
structure for the promotion of financial innovations and 
engineering of complex instruments with risk–return 
characteristics that appeared more attractive than the 
risk exposure attributes of the underlying assets. This 
process encompassed the whole spectrum of activity, 
design, origination, packaging, trading, distribution, 
wholesale and retail. Increased global demand for 
financialised assets led to higher prices for these 
instruments, thus validating expectations of ever-
increasing asset prices. Then came the collapse of asset 
prices in the real estate market in the United States 
which, due to the interconnectedness of the asset 
markets worldwide, spread rapidly and globally through 
the contagious process. 
 
The alternative view of the cause of the crisis 
holds that instability and crises are inherent and 
unavoidable in financial capitalism, because the 
structure of firms and households is inherently fragile, 
and the emergence and confluence of certain conditions 
convert fragility into instability and crises. 
 
 The Islamic financial system represents a 
financial structure substantially different from the 
dominant paradigm. It is supported by the network of 
institutional elements whose existence creates a strong 
barrier to the emergence of instability. This system is 
only in its nascent stage of development, however, and 
is operating in coexistence with the conventional system 
in a hybrid form in which many of its supportive 
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institutional elements either do not exist or are weak and 
incomplete. While theory has demonstrated that an 
Islamic financial system would be more stable than the 
dominant system, in practice such stability cannot be 
taken for granted without the full operation of its 
supportive institutional framework. This paper contends 
that the emergence and consequences of the recent 
financial crisis in the dominant system hold valuable 
lessons for the operation of the existing Islamic finance. 
Specifically, the paper suggests that because, in its 
present form, Islamic finance is embedded in systems 
that share many of the institutional features of the 
dominant system, to ensure its survival – until the 
emergence and operationalisation of its own supportive 
institutional framework – Islamic finance requires, as a 
matter of urgency, a regulatory-supervisory framework 
much stronger than exists in the dominant system. In 
particular, such a framework has to be unified, uniform 
and multinational, covering all the economies in which, in 
one form or another, Islamic finance has been adopted. 
Such a framework has to be comprehensive and 
legislatively based, and include all facets of the financial 
system. A regulatory-supervisory system of this kind is 
far more important to the Islamic financial system in its 
present stage of evolution than is the case with the 
dominant system, because the failure of even a few 
Islamic finance institutions would pose a far greater 
systemic risk and cause more reputational damage than 
would similar failure in the dominant system.  
 
To render this paper self-contained, Section II 
presents a brief definitional survey of the dominant 
financial system, its structure and functions, and its 
important constitutive elements. Section III provides a 
summary description of the current crisis, as well as the 
conventional and alternative explanations of its causes. 
Section IV discusses the elemental features of an 
Islamic financial system that distinguish it from the 
dominant system, as well as its stability characteristics. 
This section also presents the major elements of the 
institutional framework that support the Islamic financial 
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system and its stability. Finally, Section V concludes the 
paper by making a case for the design and 
implementation of a universal, comprehensive, 
legislatively-based regulatory and supervisory framework 
that ensures minimisation of systemic risk to the Islamic 
financial system at this stage of its development. 
 
 
II.  The Functions and Operations of the Financial 
System 
 
An essential feature of market economies is the 
existence of intermediaries: firms that facilitate 
transactions between producers and their suppliers of 
input, on the one hand, and between producers and 
consumers, on the other. Spulber (1996, p. 135) defines 
an intermediary as “an economic agent that purchases 
from suppliers for resale to buyers, or that helps buyers 
and sellers meet and transact. Intermediaries seek out 
suppliers, find and encourage buyers, select buy and sell 
prices, define the terms of transactions, manage the 
payments and record keeping for transactions, and hold 
inventories to provide liquidity or availability of goods 
and services.” A financial system can be thought of as a 
collection of financial firms and institutions that deal in 
and with functions of payments clearing and settling; 
financial resource pooling and allocating; transferring 
and transforming financial resources across time, space 
and kinds of assets; managing risk; and collecting, 
analysing and providing information, as well as dealing 
with informational problems. A modern financial system 
is comprised of banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
firms in securities markets for money, debt and equity 
instruments, insurance companies, credit bureaus, credit 
rating agencies, managed funds, institutional investors, 
dealers and brokers, and a central bank. These 
constituent elements perform a wide range of services 
which, inter alia, include: creating and providing liquidity; 
reducing the costs of financial transactions; screening 
and monitoring the creditworthiness and payment 
performance of their clients; bringing together buyers 
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and sellers, lenders and borrowers; providing insurance 
against risk; and managing the economy’s payments 
system. 
 
In short, a financial system is a collection of 
institutions that facilitate transactions between financial 
resources and their users, and provide support for the 
real sector of the economy to convert primary resources 
into production for final use (Fry, 1995). In other words, 
the institutions comprising a financial system 
intermediate between surplus finance units and the real 
sector investors. Because uncertainty regarding the 
future is a fact of life, there are risks intrinsic to the act of 
investing on the part of those providing financing. It is 
believed that, generally, surplus fund holders wish to 
avoid risk, while entrepreneurs are by nature risk-takers. 
Investment projects can fail due to no one’s fault. But 
they can also fail because of fraud, misrepresentation, 
negligence, and the provision of incomplete or wrong 
information. These failures arise due to an informational 
problem referred to as “asymmetric information”. 
Asymmetric information exists when any one party to a 
transaction has information regarding the subject matter 
of the transaction that the other party does not possess. 
It can appear as adverse selection or moral hazard. The 
first appears when the wrong transaction is selected 
because of hidden or inadequate information. Moral 
hazard is a concept that originated in the insurance field 
and refers to the tendency of the insured to make less 
effort to avoid risks than they would if they had no 
insurance. In financial transactions, the concept refers to 
a situation where the entrepreneur seeking financing 
intends to use the funds differently than agreed upon 
with the surplus funds holder, who either has insufficient 
information regarding the entrepreneur’s intention or has 
no control over the entrepreneur’s behaviour to mitigate 
the risk of moral hazard. This leads to the need for 
monitoring mechanisms that ensure the entrepreneur’s 
behaviour is compatible with that expected at the time of 
the transaction. The associated costs are referred to as 
“monitoring costs” (Fry, 1995, pp. 305–312). 
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It is thought that because of monitoring costs, 
surplus fund holders prefer debt contracts to sharing the 
risk of the project through equity participation. In a debt 
contract, a borrower promises to repay the principal plus 
an additional sum, the interest, over a stipulated time 
frame. This, in effect, cuts off the relationship between 
the project for which funds are needed and its financing, 
since a debt contract establishes the legal right of a 
lender to receive more money in the future in exchange 
for a given amount of principal today – it is an exchange 
of spot money for more future money – regardless of the 
outcome of the project undertaken by the investor–
entrepreneur. Indeed, if the risks of informational 
problems and associated monitoring costs are priced 
into the loan contract, then all risks are shifted to the 
entrepreneur. One explanation given for the existence of 
financial intermediaries is that, due to informational 
problems and associated monitoring costs, it is easier for 
lenders to delegate their management to a third party, 
such as a bank, which is thought to be more efficient and 
experiences economies of scale in collecting information 
on and monitoring borrowers. 
 
There are ways in which lenders remedy 
informational problems. For instance, they can ration 
lending by charging higher interest rates. However, this 
remedy mechanism also has some adverse 
consequences: it rations out potentially successful 
projects as well as risky ones; and it leads to a paradox 
where, as the lender raises interest rates beyond a 
certain point, its expected income declines as borrowers 
reduce or totally interrupt their demand for loans. 
Second, lenders can ask for collateral – that is, an asset 
of the borrower whose property rights over that asset are 
automatically transferred to the lender in the event of 
default. Third, lenders can include positive and negative 
clauses in the contract. The former requires, among 
other actions, a minimum amount of capital to be put up 
by the entrepreneur. It also requires periodic reports 
and/or inspections as part of the contract. The negative 
7 
clauses prohibit certain actions on the part of the 
borrower, including restrictions on uses of the borrower’s 
income, transfer of assets, and prior authorisation from 
the lender before any financial operation is undertaken. 
Sometimes, the borrowers themselves try to signal, at 
times at heavy costs, their trustworthiness, as well as the 
soundness of the projects they are undertaking. They 
may, for example, pay for insurance that protects the 
lenders in case of project failure and/or against the risk 
of default. Much of the financial structure of modern 
economies consists of interest-based debt contracts.  
 
Another chief characteristic of modern financial 
economies is the overwhelming presence of a credit 
system. The main difference between debt and credit is 
that, while a debt contract can assume a one-time event 
between a lender and a borrower, credit is based on a 
longer-term relationship of trust between the two, as the 
name implies. (“Credit” is derived from the Latin word 
credo, meaning “I believe”.) Economic historians suggest 
that credit, in its modern sense, began with commercial 
banking (Ferguson, 2008). However, if the term is taken 
in its broadest meaning – that is, a loan for productive 
activity – economic historian Sidney Homer (1963, pp. 
17–24) traces the origin of credit as far back as 5000 
B.C., when “capital and credit became important and 
provided a main impetus toward human progress”. 
 
 In modern times, “credit” refers to an established 
debt relationship between a financial institution and its 
borrowing client. If, however, one considers credit as the 
provision of financial resources to facilitate investment 
and production, loan agreements based on interest rates 
are not the only means of credit relations. Such a 
relationship can be based on the provision of rewards, 
not on fixed money return on principal, as in a debt 
contract, but contingent on a project’s outcome – that is, 
the expected value of the project. In other words, the 
risks of the project are shared. A debt contract is a fixed 
nominal obligation with a certain maturity date. A share 
contract does not have these features. Moreover, a 
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share is not redeemable. Such a contract does not have 
the maturity constraint of the debt contract and, provided 
a market exists, shares obtained through the provision of 
financing can be sold in case of liquidity need. Thus, 
contingent payoff, non-redeemability, maturity, liquidity, 
and risk-sharing are characteristics that distinguish a 
sharing contract from a debt contract. An advantage of 
the share contract is that, while monitoring of the 
investor–entrepreneur and the project may impose costs 
on the shareholders, because their incomes depend only 
on the expected value of the project, rather than on the 
probability of default as in a debt contract, shareholders 
need not face the risk of moral hazard or adverse 
selection. 
 
 There are other forms of mobilising finance that, 
presumably, avoid – or at least minimise – informational 
problems. These include securitisation, leasing and 
factoring. The first delinks the repayment of a loan from 
the performance of the borrowing firm by creating an 
independent entity called a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), which buys some assets with predictable revenue 
streams, such as account receivables, from the firm. 
Because the risk of the assets owned by the SPV is 
different from and less than the risk of the original firm as 
a whole, the SPV can issue new securities that are 
backed by the underlying assets (called asset-backed 
securities, or ABS), which it owns. Because of the better 
credit quality of the underlying assets, the SPV can 
mobilise funds at a lower cost. Moreover, the SPV can, 
also at a lower cost, enhance the credit quality of its 
securities. Such techniques of credit enhancement 
include tranching of the securities it issues into senior 
tranches which are repaid as the first claimants of assets 
and cash flows in case of default, and junior or 
subordinate tranches which claim residual assets and 
cash flows after senior tranches are paid. An SPV, or its 
parent firm, can create a cash reserve account to cover 
some losses in case of default and/or buy insurance to 
guarantee payoffs as a means of credit enhancement. 
Securitisation liquefies existing assets to allow the firm to 
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acquire other assets and/or pay off expensive debt. In 
leasing, a firm (lessor) allows another party (lessee) the 
use of an asset it owns in exchange for a periodic 
payment. The lessor retains the legal ownership of the 
asset while it is generating income flow for the lessee. 
Therefore, the leased asset serves as both collateral and 
a source of income generation. Factoring allows a firm to 
sell its accounts receivable to a specialised credit 
agency or bank at a discount, thereby increasing its own 
liquidity. While securitisation has mostly relied on debt 
instruments, such as asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCB), an SPV could potentially issue shares allowing 
greater risk-sharing. As was mentioned, the existence of 
informational problems in debt markets leads to 
inefficiencies stemming from attempts by lenders to 
protect themselves. An important inefficiency is credit 
rationing and high interest rates, which penalise unfairly 
low-risk projects or those with potentially high returns. 
Equity or risk-sharing contracts avoid this inefficiency; 
however, where and when the level of trust is low, 
shareholders’ costs of monitoring the entrepreneur and 
the project and efforts to become informed may not be 
negligible (Stiglitz, 1987; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990; Hillier and Ibrahimu, 1993; 
Baltensperger, 1978). 
 
 The informational problems that plague the debt 
market exist between financial institutions and their 
clients. Among these institutions, commercial banks are 
highly susceptible to informational problems in their 
relationships both with their clients and the central bank. 
In all market-based financial economies, the banks 
operate on the basis of fractional reserve, where they 
are required to maintain a fraction of the deposits in 
readily available liquid form to meet unexpected and 
sudden large withdrawals. While such reserves are 
considered as an instrument of controlling informational 
problems under normal circumstances, in the face of 
sudden shocks, the failure of one bank potentially 
becomes contagious for other banks and financial 
institutions. Such a possibility creates a systemic risk for 
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the financial system, and for the economy as a whole. 
Moreover, because the financial system in general and 
the banking system in particular facilitate and operate, 
along with the central bank, the country’s payments 
system, the failure of the financial system can spell 
disaster for the society as a whole.  
 
To stop the contagion effect of a banking crisis 
from spreading, governments, through the central bank, 
guarantee deposits up to some maximum level. This is 
referred to as “deposit insurance”. Additionally, during 
normal times, the commercial banks are allowed to use 
the central bank as their own bank to alleviate short-term 
liquidity constraints by discounting financial assets at the 
central bank. Moreover, the central bank can step in and 
save banks in whose case liquidity problems (due to bad 
decisions, fraud, mismanagement, etc.) threaten to 
convert into solvency problems. The central bank “bails 
out” these institutions to mitigate the risk of contagion 
and threat to the payments system. The disadvantage of 
deposit insurance and bailouts is that they give rise to 
moral hazards, because if a bank or an important 
financial (or even non-financial) institution is considered 
“too big to fail”, this encourages undue risk-taking on the 
part of market players. Through its intervention, the state 
uses public funds to rescue private lenders unable to 
service their debts, thus avoiding the collapse of the 
credit market and threats to the payments system while, 
at the same time, creating a moral hazard problem that 
encourages speculative behaviour within the financial 
system, including within the banking system. 
 
 The fractional reserve system molds out of its 
banks powerful creators and destroyers of credit; for 
small changes in their monetary base, the banks can 
expand credit by a multiple amount (Krichene and 
Mirakhor, 2008). Central banks exploit this ability of the 
banking system, through monetary policy, to contract or 
expand credit, depending on the result they wish to 
achieve; that is, they use the credit-creation ability of the 
banking system countercyclically. Within a financial 
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system that operates overwhelmingly with interest-based 
debt contracts as well as a fractional reserve banking 
system, there is a mechanism that operates in the 
opposite direction – that is, it has procyclical effects. 
Called leveraging, the concept refers to the use of small 
amounts of equity capital to contract loans that are 
multiples of the amount of equity. In a modern financial 
system, generally all financial institutions – banks and 
non-bank financial institutions – are highly leveraged. 
Leverage works through the balance sheet of leveraged 
institutions. To illustrate how this mechanism operates, 
consider, as a simplified example, the balance sheet of a 
commercial bank. 
 
 Commercial banks and other financial 
intermediaries are generally very sensitive to changes in 
anticipated risks and in asset prices, and manage their 
balance sheets continuously and actively. Their 
sensitivity to changes in the price of their assets is 
particularly acute when their net worth reacts to changes 
in asset prices through an accounting procedure called 
marked-to-market, meaning that the values of assets on 
their balance sheet continuously adjust as the market 
prices of those assets change. The guidance to a 
leveraged institution for active management of its 
balance sheet is the concept of value at risk (VaR), 
defined as the numerical estimate of a financial firm’s 
worst case loss and is indicated by V. Any loss beyond 
this worst case can only occur with a benchmark 
probability p. Usually, a financial intermediary, a bank, is 
required to maintain equity capital, E, to meet total value 
at risk for a total asset of A on its balance sheet, such 
that E = V x A. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
assets to equity capital – that is: L = QUOTE = QUOTE, 
so that there is an inverse relationship between the 
leverage ratio and value at risk. The implication is that as 
the value at risk declines, which happens when asset 
prices increase during an upswing in financial markets, 
the leverage ratio increases, meaning that the unit can 
take on more debt or become more leveraged. For 
commercial banks, this means higher credit creation 
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precisely when credit should contract. Therefore, 
leverage acts procyclically (Adrian and Shin, 2007).  
 
 The leverage ratio of commercial banks in the 
United States is estimated at around 10 (9.8), much 
lower than those of the investment banks, estimated at 
about 20–25 (Greenlaw et. al., 2008). A commercial 
bank’s assets are composed of securities it holds, 
including the loans it has extended; its liabilities include 
the deposits of its clients, as well as its equity capital. 
 
A simplified balance sheet of a commercial bank 
Assets Liabilities 
  
1. Securities 
2. Loans to clients (businesses, 
households and governments) 
 
1. Clients’ deposits 
2. Equity capital 
  
 
 
To simplify further, combine the asset side and 
assume the balance sheet totals at $100 where the 
assets are financed by $90 worth of debt (whose price is 
assumed constant) and $10 worth of equity capital so 
that the leverage ratio is  QUOTE   = 10, which the bank 
considers as its target leverage ratio; that is, in the case 
of an increase or decrease in the value of its assets, it 
adjusts its balance sheet to restore the target leverage 
ratio. Assume now that the price of assets declines by $1 
so that: 
 
Assets Liabilities       Assets  Liabilities 
 
 100   90 = D     asset price declines      99    90 = D 
                by $1 
  10 = E     →               9 = E 
  
 100    100          99    99  
 
As a result of the decline in the asset price, the leverage 
ratio changes → L = QUOTE = QUOTE = 11, requiring a 
balance sheet adjustment to restore the target leverage 
ratio. This means that the balance sheet has to contract, 
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since L =  QUOTE   → 10 =  QUOTE   → A = 90. The 
way the balance sheet is adjusted to restore the target 
leverage ratio is for D, debt (deposits), to decline by 9 → 
 
 
Assets Liabilities 
 
90  81 = D → asset price reduction of $1 leads to a 
                                contraction in credit extended by the 
   intermediary by $9. 
 
    9 = E   
 
 90      90 
 
Under normal circumstances, the intermediaries 
adjust the balance sheet to restore their target leverage 
ratio. In times of financial market distress, however, 
when pessimism leads to panic, the intermediaries 
increase their target leverage ratio, leading to substantial 
contraction of their balance sheet leading to reduction in 
credit. As credit distress in financial markets   picks up 
momentum, a phenomenon known as a credit crunch, 
itself the end result of deleveraging, develops.  
 
 The reverse of this process is at work when asset 
prices increase. To illustrate, return to the initial balance 
sheet and assume an increase in asset prices of $1. 
 
Assets Liabilities   Assets  Liabilities 
  
100      90 = D    asset price increases  101   90 = D 
                         by $1 
            10 = E   →     11 = E  
 
 100   100     101                101 
 
As a result, the leverage ratio has changed: L =  QUOTE   
=  QUOTE   = 9.2. To restore the target leverage, 10 =  
QUOTE   → A = 110; thus the balance expands by 
adjusting the level of debt (credit): 
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Assets  Liabilities 
 
110   99 = D 
 
      11 = E 
 
110             110 
 
In times of a rapid increase in asset prices, 
intermediaries expand their balance sheet by increasing 
credit by a multiple of the increase in their asset prices. If 
optimism about a buoyant asset market leads to 
euphoria, then the intermediaries lower their target 
leverage ratios or/and move, if possible, some of their 
assets off balance sheet. The latter lowers the numerator 
of the leverage ratio, allowing the intermediary to expand 
credit to restore its target leverage ratio. In a buoyant 
asset market these developments lead to increased 
demand for assets, forcing prices to increase beyond the 
level justified by the fundamentals of the asset itself – 
that is, a bubble will be created. As Greenlaw et. al. 
(2008, pp. 29–30) suggest:  
 
“Leverage targeting entails upward-sloping 
demands and downward-sloping supplies. The 
perverse nature of the demand and supply 
curves is even stronger when the leverage of 
the financial intermediary is pro-cyclical – that 
is, the possibility of feedback, then the 
adjustment of leverage and of price changes 
will reinforce each other in an amplification of 
the financial cycle. If greater demand for the 
asset tends to put upward pressure on its 
price, then there is the potential for feedback in 
which stronger balance sheets trigger greater 
demand for the asset, which, in turn, raises the 
asset’s price and leads to stronger balance 
sheets. The mechanism works in reverse in 
downturns. If greater supply of the asset tends 
to put down word pressure on its price, then 
weaker balance sheets lead to greater sales of 
the asset, which depresses the asset’s price 
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and leads to even weaker balance sheets. The 
balance sheet perspective gives new insights 
into the nature of financial contagion in the 
modern, market-based financial system. 
Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the 
rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets. 
When financial intermediaries’ balance sheets 
are generally strong, their leverage is too low. 
The financial intermediaries hold surplus 
capital, and they will attempt to find ways in 
which they can employ their surplus capital. In 
a loose analogy with manufacturing firms, we 
may see the financial system as having 
‘surplus capacity.’ For such surplus capacity to 
be utilised, the intermediaries must expand 
their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, 
they take on more short-term debt. On the 
asset side, they search for potential borrowers 
that they can lend to. Aggregate liquidity is 
intimately tied to how hard the financial 
intermediaries search for borrowers.” 
 
 It should be recalled that fractional reserve 
banking already gives financial intermediaries the power 
to create (and destroy) credit (therefore, money) out of 
thin air (Krichene and Mirakhor, 2008). As shown above, 
balance sheet adjustment and leverage reinforces this 
power substantially, to the point of making credit creation 
out of nothing appear extraordinarily helpful in 
stimulating economic activity. However, in referring to 
this phenomenon, Maurice Allais (1987) assets that: “in 
reality, the ‘miracles’ performed by credit are 
fundamentally comparable to the ‘miracles’ an 
association of counterfeiters could perform for its benefit 
by lending its forged banknotes in return for interest. In 
both cases, the stimulus to the economy would be the 
same, and the only difference is who benefits.” 
 
 Even if it is assumed that the credit-creating 
power of the financial intermediaries is beneficial, it is 
clear that such power also has potentially harmful effects 
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on economic activity. Because this power operates 
through interest-based debt contracts and instruments, it 
dictates the cost of the finance needed for investment; 
thus, while delinking financing from the underlying 
productive investment and assets (since it provides 
money for financing today for more money in the future, 
regardless of the outcome of the project), the price of the 
debt contract (interest rate) establishes a benchmark for 
acceptable rates of return on investment projects in the 
real sector. Thus, the interest rate on money lent today 
for more money in the future rules the rate of return to 
the real sector. Indeed, the financial sector of a modern 
economy exercises a dominating role over its production 
sector. Thus, disturbances in the financial sector are 
automatically transmitted to the production sector, 
affecting employment and income in the whole economy. 
Governments concerned with economic growth, 
employment and the severity of the impact of financial 
fluctuations on the level of economic activity focus on 
this aspect of the relationship between the financial and 
the real sector to manipulate the rate of interest charged 
by financial intermediaries on credit they extend to 
entrepreneurs, thus indirectly influencing the rate of 
return in the real sector. They do this through monetary 
policy. An active monetary policy places limits on the 
credit expansion or contraction power of financial 
intermediaries by making it either easy or difficult for 
these institutions to access the resources of the central 
bank or create an incentive for them to become more or 
less liquid through the sale of government securities, 
which constitute a significant part of intermediaries’ 
assets. Thus, to check a downward movement in the 
level of economic activity, central banks administer easy 
monetary policy; and to check an upward movement in 
activity, fearing inflation, they administer tight monetary 
policies. 
 
In addition, because financial intermediaries, 
particularly commercial banks, manage the economy’s 
payments system, and because of the deposit insurance 
system, which the government makes available to the 
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intermediaries, the state is justified in regulating and 
supervising the behaviour and performance of financial 
intermediaries. Regulation is composed of a set of rules 
imposed on these institutions to ensure the safety and 
security of their resources. Supervision ensures that the 
institutions continuously abide by these rules. One 
characteristic of regulatory frameworks is that rules are 
developed in response to past abuses or transgressions 
not foreseen by previous rules; they are, therefore, ex 
post frameworks. Given the dynamism of profit-seeking 
behaviour, financial institutions are constantly in search 
of ways and means of circumventing the rules of the 
regulatory framework. This behaviour, referred to as the 
search for regulatory arbitrage, becomes particularly 
intense when financial markets become buoyant. 
Therefore, an efficient regulatory-supervisory framework 
must dynamically and continuously adjust its constituent 
rules to new and emerging situations in the financial 
sector in order to minimise regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities. 
  
There are times in which monetary policy 
becomes passive and the regulatory-supervisory 
framework exercises forbearance in the face of changes 
in the financial system that could potentially pose serious 
risks to the economic system. This could occur either in 
response to political pressure or because of an 
underlying ideological orientation of policy-makers. 
Focusing on the latter, policy-makers and regulators may 
possess an abstract system of thought which is the 
model upon which they base their own model of 
behaviour. The policy maker follows a model which is 
itself grounded on a higher abstract underlying model, 
i.e., the basic theoretical model that the policy-maker 
uses to frame policies, is a model of the policy-maker’s 
model. One such model is derived from a major school 
of economic thought that holds that markets left to 
themselves, with minimal government intervention, are 
capable of producing the best results for the economy as 
a whole. The intellectual pedigree of this line of thought, 
known as “neoclassical economics”, dates back to the 
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classical economists, but its analytic underpinnings were 
provided in the mid-20th century by the work of Arrow 
and Debreu (1954) who demonstrated the existence of a 
general equilibrium for a competitive economy under a 
set of assumptions that included perfect information, 
complete markets, no transaction costs and no role for 
monetary factors. Under these assumptions, equilibrium 
would prevail in the economy instantaneously, with all 
resources, including labour, fully employed. 
  
Within the same general framework, two other 
propositions were developed in the second half of the 
20th century that formed the intellectual underpinnings 
(or the model of the model of the policy-maker) for an 
ideology of passive monetary policy and regulatory 
forbearance. The first was the Modigliani–Miller theorem 
(1958, 1963) which addressed the question of the 
optimal capital structure of the firm – that is, the best 
combination of sources of financing investment: equity, 
debt and internal funds (undistributed profits or retained 
earnings). The theorem stated that in a perfect capital 
market, a firm’s value depends on the profitability of the 
assets that investment generates, and not on how such 
investments were financed. This implies that a firm 
should be neutral between sources of financing. This is 
referred to as the “Modigliani–Miller neutrality theorem”. 
The second proposition was developed within the 
neoclassical framework in the 1970s and is referred to 
as the “efficient markets hypothesis” (Fama, 1970). It 
suggests essentially that competitive prices contain all 
the information required for rational economic decision-
making. The implication of this hypothesis for the real 
sector of the economy is that, given that prices include 
all the needed information, the price mechanism has the 
capability to allocate resources in such a way as to 
achieve maximum output. For the financial sector, this 
hypothesised efficiency simply means that, regardless of 
time and space considerations, asset prices are always 
and everywhere established by the demand for and 
supply of assets about which suppliers and consumers 
have made rational decisions because the prices of 
19 
these assets contain all the information required for such 
decisions. Therefore, the prevailing asset prices are the 
correct ones, reflecting the true value of assets. If asset 
prices change, it is because new information regarding 
the assets themselves has become available. In other 
words, the market as a whole has the correct view of 
asset prices that reflect the underlying fundamental 
values of the assets. Even if each individual participant 
in the market (including investors, dealers and lenders) 
has an inaccurate estimate of the asset values, as a 
group the market participants will not over- or 
underestimate the fundamental value of the assets. This 
would imply no overconfidence, or bubbles, in the 
market as a whole. Therefore, no matter how wildly 
asset prices swing, such fluctuations are the market’s 
response to changes in the underlying fundamental 
characteristics of the assets themselves, reflecting the 
scarcity or oversupply of the assets in the market. Asset 
price bubbles – when market prices deviate substantially 
from the price justified by the underlying fundamentals – 
are a natural reaction of the market. Some consider 
bubbles as beneficial because they stimulate the 
mobilisation of resources for investment in the assets 
whose prices are rapidly rising. Moreover, no attempt 
should be made to stop rising asset prices, because 
even if bubbles burst, the net effect for society is 
positive, and because rising bubbles are difficult to 
predict in the first place (Gross, 2007). 
 
The perfect market paradigm, and the attendant 
notions of the existence of a competitive equilibrium, 
neutrality of capital structure (that is, debt-to-equity ratio) 
and the efficient market hypothesis, all of which were 
developed between 1950 and 1970, assume perfect 
rationality on the part of market participants, making 
decisions with perfect information in a market in which 
every risk, every commodity and every contingency is 
fully identifiable (no uncertainty) and representable by a 
tradable market instrument. That is, it was assumed that 
for every and all contingencies, a tradable security was 
available – in other words, the market is complete. 
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Moreover, the market is assumed to be frictionless, 
without transactions or information costs. Further, it is 
fully liquid; trade can take place instantaneously. 
Financial resources pose no constraints as participants 
can borrow instantaneously and without limit. Such a 
market ensures the optimal allocation of resources for 
maximum output. It is also efficient, as prices adjust 
instantaneously and appropriately to any new 
information. This information cannot be predicted ahead 
of its appearance; it is random and, once it appears, 
everyone will have it. Market prices adjust quickly to the 
random information; therefore, prices also change 
randomly, leaving no room for anyone, including dealers 
and traders, to earn income from trading in new 
information. Most importantly, in such a market risks are 
spread uniformly among all the market participants 
because insurance against all risks is available to every 
participant. 
  
It is important to note that, while rigorous 
mathematical models demonstrate the existence of 
equilibrium for competitive markets under the above 
assumptions, the stability of such equilibriums is much 
more difficult to demonstrate. It turns out that relaxation 
of the underlying assumptions renders the competitive 
market equilibrium erratic and unstable. Nevertheless, 
and despite the unrealism of its assumption, the efficient 
market is considered as an ideal paradigm toward which 
all market economies must progress. In this light, 
volatility and turbulence is caused by shocks that the 
market experiences because of information imperfection 
(the informational problems discussed earlier) and/or 
market incompleteness (not enough security instruments 
for all contingencies). The ideology of adherence to the 
efficient market paradigm becomes a model of the model 
based on which policy is formulated. All financial 
innovations represent progress toward market 
completeness, and all volatilities (including the formation 
and implosion of bubbles) are attempts by the market to 
adjust to new information. In such a belief system, 
market intervention may have negative consequences 
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for the economy. Therefore, the best course of action is 
a passive policy and regulatory forbearance. Thus, the 
former Chairman of the Board of the central bank of the 
United States (the Federal Reserve) considered new 
financial innovations such as derivatives as a means 
of “dispersion of risk to those willing and able to bear it” 
and as instruments that would prevent “cascading 
failures” (Greenspan, 2002). The implication of the latter 
is that new instruments make it possible to spread risk 
around and away from the commercial banks, thereby 
mitigating the risk of contagion in the banking system 
(“cascading failures”). The Chairman’s view of using 
active monetary policy to target bubbles also reflected 
the underlying ideology. As late as December 12, 2007, 
in an op-ed page article in the Wall Street Journal, he 
remarked: 
 
“After more than a half-century observing 
numerous price bubbles evolve and deflate, I 
have reluctantly concluded that bubbles 
cannot be safely defused by monetary policy 
or other policy initiatives before the speculative 
fever breaks on its own.”  
 
 Given the history of the ideologically based 
deregulation movement in the United States since the 
early 1980s, the Chairman’s reference to “other policy 
initiatives” should not be difficult to understand. The 
basic idea is that because asset price bubbles are 
elusive and impossible to spot until they burst, monetary 
policy should not target rising asset prices in a particular 
sector since any preemptive action to do so runs the risk 
of derailing the whole economy (Kohn, 2006). Since the 
underlying model of the policy-maker’s model is the 
efficient market paradigm, regulation would be 
administered with the “light touch” as monetary policy. 
(For a readable account of the unrealism of the efficient 
market paradigm, see Cooper, 2008.) It was only after 
the crisis was in full swing that Mr. Greenspan 
acknowledged that the efficient market was a flawed 
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paradigm. Robert Skidelsky states in a recent article in 
The New York Times Magazine (2008): 
 
“Among the most astonishing statements to be 
made by any policymaker in recent years was 
Alan Greenspan’s admission this autumn that 
the regime of deregulation he oversaw as 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve was based 
on a ‘flaw’: he had overestimated the ability of 
a free market to self-correct and had missed 
the self-destructive power of deregulated 
mortgage lending. The ‘whole intellectual 
edifice,’ he said, ‘collapsed in the summer of 
last year.’ What was this ‘intellectual edifice’? 
As so often with policymakers, you need to 
tease out their beliefs from their policies. 
Greenspan must have believed something like 
the efficient market hypothesis which holds 
that financial markets always price assets 
correctly. Given that markets are efficient, they 
would need only the lightest regulation. 
Government officials who control the money 
supply have only one task – to keep prices 
roughly stable.” 
 
 Greenspan, of course, was not alone in thinking 
that interventions to deflate a bubble may do more harm 
than good. For example, as late as 29 February 2008, 
the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, in a speech before the US 
Monetary Forum, asked: “Should a policymaker deflate a 
bubble before it becomes problematic?” He then 
answered: “I am skeptical that we can identify bubbles 
with enough accuracy and know enough about how to 
act to say that we wouldn’t have more failures than 
success…” Furthermore, as former Chairman 
Greenspan (2004) noted, in order to make sure you 
burst a bubble, you have to attack it aggressively, 
because if your attack fails, it just gets bigger. And there 
are big risks to the real economy.” Similar sentiments 
were expressed by the President of the European 
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Central Bank (8 June 2005) in a speech given in 
Singapore, titled “Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary 
Policy”. 
 
 
III.  The Crisis, and Explanations of its Causes 
 
It does not seem too long ago that most analysts 
believed that only developing countries would 
experience booms and busts, along with the rapid credit 
expansions and contractions that accompany them. It 
was believed that the growing sophistication of the 
financial system, as well as the deeper and greater 
macroeconomic stability in developed, industrial market 
economies, had mitigated the risk of emergence of 
crises. There were, however, warnings from some 
analysts that, while the likelihood of occurrence of 
systemic crisis may have been reduced due to better 
policy-making, the development and growth of financial 
markets and instruments, better information and the 
wider dispersion of risk in advanced economies, the 
potential adverse impact of a crisis, if it occurs, is more 
severe in these economies than is generally assumed 
(Gai et. al., 2007; Rajan, 2005)  precisely because of 
rapidly growing complex financial innovations as well as 
the prolonged period during which major crises were 
resolved quickly. 
  
The recent crisis began in the sub-prime 
mortgage market of the US financial system. “Sub-prime” 
refers to a segment of the market in which mortgages 
were issued and credit was extended to buyers with a 
low credit score, brief or no credit history, few or no 
assets, and poor income-earning prospects. These 
loans, referred to as “Ninja loans” (no income, no jobs 
and no assets), were extended in the lending frenzy that 
was in full swing at least three to four years prior to the 
start of the crisis. In the period of run-up to the crisis, the 
US and global economies displayed robust growth, 
which was expected to continue. Interest rates were low, 
liquidity was high and growing, financial innovations 
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were proceeding at a rapid pace (especially in 
securitisation and structure finance), complacency in the 
face of growing risk was deepening, and regulation and 
supervision were receding and weakening. All of this 
created an incentive structure that encouraged 
excessive risk-taking in search of higher yields. By 
March of 2007, the excesses “came home to roost”. High 
liquidity, low interest rates and easy credit had already 
created an incentive for home purchases and refinancing 
of existing mortgages. Prices in the housing market were 
already increasing, indicating a boom. This provided the 
primary motivation for the emergence of the sub-prime 
market, for as long as house prices were increasing, the 
underlying debt obligation would be continuously 
validated by the increase in value regardless of the size 
of the downpayment, the credit record of the buyer and 
the adequacy of documentation. 
 
The sub-prime borrowers comprised a riskier 
class, generally with a FICO credit score of less than 640 
(a credit score developed by Fair Isaac & Company, 
ranging between 300 and 850, with a higher score 
indicating a better chance of repayment), delinquency on 
some debt repayment in the two years preceding the 
mortgage application and/or declared bankruptcy in 
previous years. For this class of borrowers to have 
access to credit, the mortgages would need to be 
structured differently and the underwriting standards 
would have to be substantially weaker. Moreover, real 
estate developers, appraisers, and insurers and lenders 
had to cooperate to show a reasonable loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio for the mortgage. To encourage borrowers, 
lenders would offer a 30-year mortgage with a low or 
zero downpayment and low interest rates for the first two 
to three years, after which the loan would be reset at 
double-digit interest rates. Often, mortgage contracts 
would include a prohibitive cost of early repayment to 
ensure a steady underlying stream of payment flows. 
Banks would then package these mortgages (initiated by 
themselves or real estate developers) and sell them to a 
special purpose vehicle subsidiary they had established. 
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In turn, the SPV would securitise them into mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and rearrange them to 
transform them into newly innovated instruments called 
collateralised debt obligations (CDO), which would direct 
the assets into different tranches with different credit 
ratings, interest rate payments, and terms of priority of 
repayment. 
  
A given CDO would be composed of hundreds 
of sub-prime MBS divided into high-rated tranches that 
paid low interest but with the higher security of being the 
first to be paid in the event of default, and lower-rated 
subordinated tranches that paid higher interest rates but 
with lower security of repayment. The risk appetite of the 
buyer of these instruments would determine which 
tranche would be purchased. Further innovation made it 
possible for an SPV to use these CDOs as an underlying 
asset to allow another round of packaging them into 
CDO-squared, which would again be dissected into 
various tranches and sold. In turn, these CDO-squared 
could be used for another round of repackaging into 
CDO-cubed, the next layer of CDOs. On top of these 
CDOs was another layer of instruments, the CDOs of 
credit default swaps, which were essentially an 
insurance written by the originating bank, or a “monoline” 
insurer that guaranteed the return to “senior” tranches. 
(For a full explanation of these instruments, see: “Credit 
Derivatives Explained”, prepared by Lehman Brothers’ 
Structured Credit Research, available on the Internet.) 
This model has been referred to as the “originate and 
distribute” model. Greater distance was created between 
the original underlying MBS assets and every new layer 
of instruments, which were distributed far and wide to all 
geographically dispersed market participants in the form 
of structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits. 
For a fee, banks would establish, usually in a tax and 
regulatory haven, SPVs, SIVs, or conduits to hold CDOs 
or MBS on behalf of their clients. The conduits would 
actively participate in the commercial paper market to 
borrow short to invest in higher-yielding, longer-term 
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assets, such as mortgage-based securities or collateral 
debt obligations.  
 
The basis of structured securitisation was a 
system of credit arbitrage that needed yet another 
system of credit rating that would give confidence to the 
purchasers of these securities that the underlying risks 
were sufficiently analysed and rated. Credit agencies 
have the primary responsibility for determining the equity 
cushion, level of overcapitalisation, and insurance 
guarantees, as well as other means of credit 
enhancement, that would permit an instrument to be 
rated as investment grade. As it turned out, credit 
agencies were not only approached for their credit rating 
function, but were also consulted, for a fee, on the 
design and structuring of a securitisation activity. The 
SPVs, and other issuers of structured security, would 
always select the rating agency that granted investment 
grade to the security at the least possible cost and avoid 
those agencies that were more cautious. This created an 
incentive for the credit rating agencies to become more 
liberal in their risk assessment. As Mark Adels testified 
before the US Congress on 27 September 2007, the 
willingness of the credit agencies to allow a deterioration 
of credit standards – in part to gain business for 
themselves, in part because of the absence of 
appropriate historical data on structured securities on 
which to model the default characteristics of the 
securities they were rating, and in part because the 
markets validated less conservative risk assessments – 
resulted in the erosion of equity cushions being 
demanded of the structured assets.  
 
 Most active participants in these newly developed 
and complex instruments were unregulated financial 
institutions, such as hedge funds. The SPVs, themselves 
established by a parent bank, were off the balance sheet 
of the bank. This would not only allow the parent bank to 
liquefy otherwise illiquid (mortgage) assets and expand 
its balance sheet for greater leverage operation and 
credit expansion, but would also allow much more room 
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to manoeuvre for regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, non-
bank financial institutions, such as hedge funds, private 
equity funds and SPVs, were mostly free of the 
regulatory-supervisory framework which, to an extent, 
constrained the banks’ leverage operation. Whereas the 
banks’ leverage ratio was about 10, these non-bank 
institutions could have leverage ratios as large as 30, as 
was the case with the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM). Increased leverage further 
energised an already high level of credit and liquidity in 
search of higher yields that could only find outlets in 
further risk-taking, particularly in the housing market, 
which could go on as long as house prices appreciated. 
And, as George Soros (2008) stated in an article in the 
New York Review of Books:  
 
“The longer the double-digit rise in house 
prices lasted, the more lax the lending 
practices became. In the end, people could 
borrow 100 percent of inflated house prices 
with no money down.… the excesses became 
evident after house prices peaked in 2006 and 
subprime mortgage lenders began declaring 
bankruptcy around March 2007. The problem 
reached crisis proportions in August 2007 … 
and spread with amazing rapidity to other 
markets. Some highly leveraged hedge funds 
collapsed and some lightly regulated financial 
institutions … had to be acquired by other 
institutions in order to survive. Confidence in 
the creditworthiness of many financial 
institutions was shaken and interbank lending 
was disrupted. In quick succession, a variety 
of esoteric credit markets – ranging from 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) to 
auction-rated municipal bonds – broke down 
one after another. After periods of calm, crisis 
episodes recurred in January 2008 … in March 
… and then in July…. The deepest fall of all 
came in September, caused by the disorderly 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in which 
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holders of commercial paper – for example, 
short-term, unsecured promissory notes – 
issued by Leman lost their money. Then the 
inconceivable occurred: the financial system 
melted down. A large money market fund that 
had invested in commercial paper issued by 
Lehman Brothers ‘broke the buck,’ i.e., its 
asset value fell below the dollar amount 
deposited, breaking the implicit promise that 
deposits in such funds are totally safe and 
liquid. This started a run on money market 
funds and the funds stopped buying 
commercial paper. Since they were the largest 
buyers, the commercial paper market ceased 
to function. The issuers of commercial paper 
were forced to draw down their credit lines, 
bringing interbank lending to a standstill. Credit 
spreads – i.e., the risk premium over and 
above the riskless rate of interest – widened to 
unprecedented levels and eventually the stock 
market was also overwhelmed by panic. All 
this happened in the space of a week.” 
 
 Very quickly, the surviving banks and non-bank 
financial institutions began the process of deleveraging; 
the credit crunch was in full swing, with what Soros 
called “the financial system in cardiac arrest”. 
Conventional explanations of the causes of the crisis 
pivot on factors such as the frenzied pace of financial 
innovation, which produced complex financial 
instruments that only a very few of their purchasers 
understood, and excessively high liquidity in search of a 
destination and high yield. This was coupled with lax and 
inefficient or nonexistent regulatory-supervisory 
oversight, unfettered growth of financial instruments, 
such as new derivatives and swaps, plus the fact that 
high-liquidity leverage within the financial system 
reached unprecedented heights. As mentioned earlier, 
high leverage allows expansion of credit to energise 
asset price increases and the formation of bubbles. The 
conventional view sees nothing adverse in high leverage 
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in a dynamic financial system during an upswing. It 
does, however, consider deleveraging during the 
downswing phase of the asset market as the cause of 
financial crises. In this phase of a “leverage-induced 
crisis”, financially stressed firms have to liquidate assets 
to meet their debt obligations. As many firms have to sell 
assets, market prices decline, leading to a decrease in 
the value of the collateral of the firms, forcing yet further 
liquidation. The firms need liquidity, but those who would 
buy assets in normal market conditions are themselves 
liquidity constrained or in a state of panic, forcing them 
out of the market. Firms needing to meet the demands of 
their creditors who are deleveraging must continue to 
sell assets in an illiquid market, thus forcing further asset 
price declines. The process is referred to as “debt 
deflation”, a term coined by Irving Fisher during the 
Great Depression. The financial crisis becomes an 
economic crisis, which, if unchecked by public policy, 
leads ultimately to a depression as investment, 
production, income and employment continuously 
decline. 
 
The conventional view also considers marked-
to-market accounting rules – which, under normal market 
conditions, price assets according to what they would be 
worth if they were to be sold at any given moment – as 
another factor that enhanced the downward spiral of the 
recent crisis. During a crisis, assets cannot be sold 
easily, if at all, since there are very few buyers liquid 
enough or willing enough to buy them. When there is no 
market for an asset, it is said that it has become “toxic”; 
and portfolios that include toxic assets are called 
“contaminated portfolios”. In such cases, there is no 
market to which the asset could be marked, and if a 
marked-to-market rule is binding, assets cannot be 
valued and cannot serve as collateral for credit that 
relieves the liquidity constraint. Markets have a price 
discovery function. To perform this function, the markets 
require buyers and sellers. When there are only sellers – 
but no buyers – in the market for a financial asset that 
has some organic relation to other assets in the market, 
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the market becomes contaminated. If the level of 
contamination is high enough to affect adversely the 
price discovery function of the related assets, the first 
asset is said to have become toxic. The firms, unable to 
raise credit, will be forced into a “fire sale” of their assets, 
which often provides insufficient funds for the firm to 
unwind its positions. In the case of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions that operate under a minimum 
equity capital, the fire sale becomes a necessity 
because these institutions fear falling below their 
minimum capital requirement. This adds further negative 
energy to the already existing state of panic in the 
financial system, enforcing pessimism and the flight to 
liquidity as a precautionary move, and ultimately feeding 
and strengthening the ongoing credit crunch, thereby 
adding to the severity of the crisis. During a crisis, the 
marked-to-market accounting rule forces the process of 
asset price determination to become oriented toward 
liquidity pressures, rather than toward the fundamental 
values of the assets. This is particularly damaging to 
highly leveraged institutions as their equity capital base 
approaches their absolute minimum during the boom 
phase of a cycle to allow them to expand their credit and 
acquire high-yield financial assets. In the recent crisis, 
many banks that had established SPVs had also either 
guaranteed (explicitly or implicitly) the underlying assets, 
the assets they originated and sold to their own SPVs, or 
had established credit lines for the SPVs to buy back the 
commercial papers the latter issued. These were ways 
and means by which the banks enhanced the credit of 
the securities issued by their SPVs. By selling their 
assets to the SPVs they had established, the banks 
moved those assets off their balance sheets, which 
allowed them to expand their balance sheets and, at the 
same time (or so the banks thought), pass the risks to 
the buyers of these assets. When the crisis hit, the credit 
lines and the guarantees forced these institutions to 
bring these assets back on to their balance sheets, thus 
contracting them, which led to reduced credit and thus 
worsened the ongoing credit crunch. 
 
31 
Yet another factor contributing to the 
emergence of crisis, in the conventional view, has been 
the risk management model followed by financial 
institutions. The risk management system the banks and 
non-bank institutions used, by and large, ignored the 
possibility of a market crisis, which should have been an 
important risk in the sub-prime market. It was not 
recognised that markets are interrelated and that, during 
a crisis, this interrelationship amplifies. When, during a 
crisis, one market becomes liquidity constrained, the 
institutions (or fund managers) are forced to sell assets 
(or positions) they hold in other markets, producing a 
decline in asset prices in these other markets and 
triggering asset sales by highly leveraged institutions 
(fund managers). Liquidity stress in the first market 
adversely affects other markets, which may have 
otherwise been healthy, through contagion. As Soros 
described, the powerful linkages among markets 
became obvious during the recent crisis. In a debt-
dominated financial system, credit is extended on the 
basis of an ex ante, fixed interest debt contract without 
an organic relation to the underlying real sector 
investment. Debt contracts are reinforced by collateral. 
Asset price increases raise the value of the collateral 
and the credit quality of the borrower, as well as the 
credit-creating power of the leveraged institutions. This, 
in turn, stimulates further demand for financial assets, 
leading to a cycle of increased asset prices, higher 
credit, higher borrowing, and greater demand for assets. 
Asset price declines trigger the reverse movement of the 
process. “In debt-funded asset markets, price declines 
beget asset sales that beget more asset declines, 
morphing into a self-reinforcing positive feedback cycle” 
(Cooper, 2008). 
 
Since, in the conventional view, market liquidity 
– especially too little liquidity during the down phase of a 
financial crisis – plays an important role as a factor 
contributing to crisis, a digression may be useful. It is 
argued that, in modern capitalism, financial markets 
perform two pivotal functions: they provide information 
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and liquidity. The role of the financial system as a 
provider of information was discussed earlier and need 
not be repeated here. Provision of liquidity is considered 
as a major function of the financial system, far more 
important than providing information. The efficient 
market paradigm takes as given that there is sufficient 
liquidity in the market to allow ready sales and 
purchases of financial assets, at zero transaction costs, 
by relatively small market participants who execute their 
trades without affecting the price – that is, the 
participants are price-takers, and neither they nor the 
level of liquidity can move prices. It turns out, however, 
that liquidity is a crucial factor in allowing financial assets 
to be bought and sold, at low transaction costs. Most 
importantly, it is liquidity and the ability to provide it that 
creates opportunities for profits for financial market 
participants by influencing the demand for and supply of 
assets and, therefore, the prices of assets traded. 
Participants who demand liquidity, and those that supply 
it, must move the market to the point where the price 
yields satisfy them. To those who demand liquidity when 
they offer an asset for sale to liquefy a position, time is 
the most crucial factor since they are attempting to 
liquefy one position in order to take a more profitable 
position once they obtain the liquidity they need to do so.  
 
To the suppliers of liquidity, on the other hand, it 
is the price that matters. A deviation of the price from 
what is considered fair (as reflected by the fundamentals 
of an asset) provides a profit opportunity (particularly in 
the short run) for when the asset price returns to its fair 
value. Profit opportunities are embedded in the bid–offer 
spread. This view of speculation found its first full 
intellectual support from Milton Friedman (1953) who 
argued that when market prices of assets diverge from 
their fundamental value a profitable opportunity is 
created for speculators to step in and, through trade, 
force prices back to their fundamental values. The 
market intermediaries whose roles are crucial in the 
provision of liquidity in the financial market are: (i) market 
makers and specialists who operate on the exchange 
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floors of the markets and whose job is to move the prices 
in accordance with asset sellers who need liquidity; (ii) 
broker–dealers in markets where there are no central 
exchanges, such as markets for corporate bonds and 
MBS; and (iii) hedge funds and other leveraged 
institutions that earn profits through speculation. The first 
two market players focus on short-term trade, while the 
speculators take a long-term view in their trading. The 
conventional view holds that, far from playing a parasitic 
role, these intermediaries perform a vital function in the 
financial system and the economy as a whole by 
providing liquidity to the market. Through this service, 
they make financial resources available to market 
participants, manage risk, make expert judgements 
regarding the differential between the market price of a 
financial asset and its fundamental value, and, through 
execution of trades, assist in the emergence of 
equilibrium in the market. For all these services, they 
deserve remuneration. In the recent crisis, however, the 
conventional view holds that market conditions were 
such as to create incentives for these players to take 
excessive risks, which proved disastrous when the down 
phase of asset market prices began. 
 
To summarise, the conventional view holds that 
the emergence of the crisis was due to a number of 
factors, including: extraordinarily high liquidity; rapid 
pace of financial engineering which innovated complex, 
opaque and difficult-to-understand financial instruments 
way ahead of the market; informational problems caused 
by lack of transparency in asset market prices, 
particularly in the market for structured credit 
instruments; outdated, lax or absent regulatory-
supervisory oversight, which encouraged excessive risk-
taking; faulty risk management and accounting models; 
and the emergence of an incentive structure that created 
a complicit coalition composed of financial institutions, 
real estate developers and appraisers, insurance 
companies and credit-rating agencies whose actions led 
to a deliberate underestimation and underpricing of risk. 
The conventional view suggests that mitigating the risk 
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of emergence of similar financial crises in the future 
requires: (i) “efficient”, rather than “more”, regulations 
and supervision that avoids excesses in risk-taking; (ii) 
prudentially higher capital requirement or 
collateralisation to reduce leveraging; (iii) improving risk 
management to focus on market and systemic risk, 
rather than the risk to individual institutions; (iv) 
designing and adopting an improved system of due 
diligence by financial institutions and financial assets 
and instruments; (v) designing and adopting an 
improved system of liquidity management by institutions 
participating in the financial market that would mitigate 
liquidity risk – that is, the chance that a holder of an 
asset may not be able to sell it quickly; (vi) designing 
and establishing a last resort liquidity provider that can 
buy assets from liquidity-stressed market participants 
and hold them in order to infuse liquidity into the market 
until it returns to normalcy; (vii) creating an incentive 
system for banks to bring on board and consolidate off-
balance sheet items to which they have extended 
(explicit or implicit) guarantees and credit lines; and (viii) 
revising the marked-to-market accounting rule to avoid 
enforcing and accelerating the downward pressure on 
asset prices in times of liquidity stress. (For details of the 
conventional view of the crisis and its causes, see 
various documents of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 2006–2007, including World Economic Outlook, 
Global Financial Stability Report and Finance and 
Development; and various publications (including 
speeches by governors and the chairmen) of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Bank for International Settlements 
and the European Central Bank.) 
 
There is an alternative view that sees crises as 
endogenous, endemic to financial capitalism. More 
specifically, instability and crises are inherent in a 
financial system where the predominant mode of 
financing is interest-based debt contracts and credit. 
According to economic historians, from its very 
beginning, profit-seeking for the purpose of wealth 
accumulation has characterised capitalism and 
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distinguished it from other economic systems. At the 
heart of the financial wealth-creating institutional 
framework of financial capitalism is a system of debt–
credit creation centred in the commercial banking sub-
system that places a multiple of the deposits of many 
depositors at the disposal of borrowers of money capital. 
In essence, every deposit expands into a multiple of 
itself to become loans (credit) in the hands of the 
borrowers (Krichene and Mirakhor, 2008). In the 
process, the banks make money off the interest rates 
they charge on the money they lend for more money in 
the future. Part of the borrowed money finances new 
investments, part finances purchases of financial assets, 
and the rest finances current consumption. The only part 
of the created credit that helps in the expansion of the 
economy is the part that is borrowed to finance 
investment, which provides the future flow of income to 
validate the debt obligation that made the financing of 
investment possible. 
 
It is worth noting that, contrary to the common 
view, consumption today validates the debt obligations 
incurred for financing of past investments. A fall in 
consumption represents a failure to validate payment 
obligations made in the past. For validation of past and 
present obligations, investment and consumption must 
grow. Debt and credit, however, grow or decline for 
reasons different from those that cause investment and 
production to grow; there is no direct connection 
between credit expansion and investment in the real 
sector (for production). There is an indirect connection 
between them through the interest rate mechanism. The 
interest rate is set by the financial institutions (banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries) for loaning money. 
These institutions are only tangentially interested in the 
real rate of returns to an investment project, and that 
only as a signal that payment obligations will be 
validated. To ensure that this will be the case, lenders 
ask for collateral. As such a financial system becomes 
more sophisticated and more dynamic, ways and means 
will be sought through innovations to financialise as 
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many commodities and real assets as possible. The 
process of financialisation, it is argued, expands access 
to finance, thus reducing the force of financial 
constraints. The financialisation process transforms 
illiquid real economic resources into asset classes that 
are traded in various asset markets. If and when a 
financial sector is dominated by interest rate-based debt 
contracts, the financialisation process creates more and 
more debt as it expands throughout the economy, 
converting equity in real assets into debt. This was the 
case in the early stages of the housing boom in the 
United States, where excess liquidity and low interest 
rates created an incentive for homeowners to cash out 
equities built up in their homes through refinancing. The 
cashed-out equity supported a consumption boom. 
 
It is noted that the securitisation that has been 
ongoing over the past three decades is part of the 
general process of financialisation. While it is quite 
conceivable that financialisation (or securitisation) could 
be just as easily equity based, the dominant force of 
socio-political factors and the power structure have 
created incentives for debt-based financialisation. The 
result has been rapidly growing corporate debt-to-equity 
and household debt-to-income ratios; acceleration of 
dominance of the financial sector relative to the real 
sector; income transfer from the real sector to the 
financial sector; deterioration of income distribution and 
increased income inequality; and changes in the 
orientation of the US economy from a saving–
investment–production–export orientation to one of 
borrowing–debt–consumption–import (Palley, 2007). 
 
This reorientation has transformed economic 
productive activities so that they resemble participation 
in the activities of a casino, as Keynes remarked, or in 
those of a racetrack, both of which use real resources 
but produce no real output, no productive investment 
(Hirschleifer, 1971). Such an economy produces “rolling 
bubbles” in financialised assets. As one bubble bursts, 
finance moves to another. Such has been the case over 
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the past three decades, as bubbles were created and then 
imploded in the emerging market debt, dotcom, real estate 
and commodities markets. In none of these bubbles 
investments in real productive activities were the primary 
objective of debt and credit expansion. Expectations of 
higher prices for the financial assets attracted participants in 
droves, creating bubbles. That this would happen was 
analytically demonstrated as early as the 1980s. For 
example, Flood and Garber (1980) demonstrated that 
rational individuals participate in asset price bubbles if they 
have expectations of rising asset prices. Growth in liquidity, 
low interest rates, higher leverage and rapidly expanding 
credit, combined with regulatory-supervisory forbearance and 
passivity, accelerate the emergence and growth of bubbles. 
 
Growth in the volume of debt in the United States 
over the past three decades has been the defining 
characteristic of the process of financialisation. Palley (2007) 
estimates that the total credit-to-GDP ratio grew from 140% 
to 328.6% of GDP between 1973 and 2005, while mortgage 
debt-to-GDP grew from 48.7% to 97.5% over the same 
period. Household debt-to-GDP grew from 45.2% in 1973 to 
94% in 2005. Palley also presents data demonstrating that 
financialisation not only has led to the rapid expansion of 
debt, but has also contributed to adverse “changes in the 
functional distribution of income, wage stagnation, and 
increased income inequality” (Palley, 2007). In Section II, 
reference was made to the Modigliani–Miller theorem of 
neutrality of the corporate financial structure (represented by 
the debt-to-equity ratio), which argued that how a firm 
finances its investment is irrelevant to its value. However, 
within the US financial system, there is an incentive structure 
in place that biases the financial structure in favour of debt. 
The US tax code gives interest payments a more favourable 
treatment than dividends and profits. Moreover, corporations 
can use debt and interest payments to reduce other claims 
(workers) on its income stream. Additionally, the rate of 
return on equity capital of the firm increases through debt 
financing, which allows it to expand leverage. 
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Corporations as well as consumers “have been 
encouraged to adopt a cult of debt finance. To reinforce 
the process of progressive reliance on debt finance, 
asset price inflation provides consumers and firms with 
collateral to support debt-financial spending. Borrowing 
is also supported by steady financial innovation that 
ensures a flow of new financial products, allowing 
leverage and widening the range of assets that can be 
collateralised.” (Palley, 2007). A theoretical foundation of 
justification of financialisation has been the work of the 
Arrow–Debreu framework. In this model, financial assets 
represent contingent claims, not those resulting from ex 
ante, fixed-return debt contracts. That is, claims are 
validated if a future contingent state materialises. These 
contingent claims result from financing of investment in 
the real sector. When a firm finances an investment in 
the real sector by issuing an ex ante, fixed-return debt, 
the result is not a state-contingent claim – that is, it does 
not depend on the outcome of the investment project for 
which financing was obtained. The debt contract requires 
repayment on the date specified by the contract 
regardless of the outcome of the project. In effect, the 
financing bears no relation to the real investment. While 
it is true that the investor undertaking the project must 
compare the rate of return to the project to the rate of 
interest specified by the debt contract, the financing itself 
(that is, the lender, amounts borrowed, the debt contract, 
and the rate of interest charged) is, in effect, decoupled 
from the real sector investment. Thus, the rate of interest 
specified in a debt contract, which is essentially a 
promise to pay more money in the future for an amount 
of spot money, dominates the rate of return to 
investment in the real sector without the financing itself 
having an organic relation to that investment. 
 
While in the early stages of the growth of the 
debt-dominated financial system there is a tenuous 
relationship between financing and real sector 
investment through the conduit of an entrepreneur’s 
comparison of the expected rate of return to the 
investment project and the rate of interest, as 
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financialisation proceeds and debt securitisation grows in 
sophistication, the relationship becomes progressively 
less important. As the financial sector grows to dominate 
the real sector, layer upon layer of securitisation thins 
the connection between the two to the point where an 
inverted pyramid of debt is supported by a very narrow 
base of real sector output and assets. The overwhelming 
dominance of the financial sector over the real sector 
can be discerned by noting that the ratio of global 
financial assets to the world’s annual output of goods 
and services grew from 109% in 1980 to 316% in 2005. 
Similarly, while the total world GDP was about US$48 
billion in 2006, the value of global financial assets in the 
same year was US$140 billion (nearly three times as 
much). As of 2007, the global liquidity market was 
estimated to be 12.5 times as large as the global GDP. 
Financial derivatives constituted 80% of this liquidity. As 
Lim (2008, p. 13) suggests, a point has been reached 
“where what happens in the financial markets affects, or 
perhaps dictates, what happens in the real economy. It 
is the case of the tail wagging the dog.” 
 
The alternative explanations of financial crises 
view them as internally generated instability episodes 
that inevitably arise from the basic debt–credit–interest 
rate relations. Where a financial system is dominated by 
interest-based debt and credit contracts, a fundamental 
“conflict between guaranteeing return of capital while 
also putting that capital at risk is a key channel through 
which financial instability can be, and recently has been 
generated” (Cooper, 2008). Fractional reserve banking 
and its close relatives in the form of money market funds 
and other financial innovations operated by highly 
leveraged institutions ensure that the credit (and debt) 
creation process amplifies manifold. This takes place 
through the mechanism of a money-credit multiplier 
within the fractional reserve banking system, and 
through leverage ratios within the banking system as 
well as other highly leveraged financial institutions. 
Credit multiplies during the upswing phase of a financial 
cycle, when financial asset market price bubbles 
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emerge; and is rapidly destroyed during the downswing 
phase, when bubbles burst. “In money markets, as with 
most debt markets, the way to earn highest rates of 
interest is to make loans for the longest possible periods 
to the lowest quality, least reliable investors. The 
pressure for high money market yields, therefore, 
encourages fund managers toward a high-risk lending 
strategy. But this strategy runs into direct conflict with the 
money market fund’s commitment to give back all of the 
investor’s money, plus interest earned, without the risk of 
losses” (Cooper, 2008). What is true of money market 
funds is much more forcefully true of other highly 
leveraged financial institutions such as hedge funds, 
SPVs, SIVs and others. The paradox of a debt-
dominated, dynamic financial system is that, as it 
innovates layer upon layer of debt-based financial 
instruments, the real (productive) sector of the economy 
(the part of the economy that, ultimately, has to generate 
income streams to validate all the repayments of 
financial capital, plus the interest rates stipulated ex ante 
in debt contracts) shrinks in size relative to the financial 
markets. As noted above, Lim (2008) estimated that the 
global size of the financial assets in 2007 was 12.5 times 
that of global GDP! That such an inverted pyramid would 
eventually collapse under its own weight seems 
inevitable. Additionally, debt contracts essentially pit ex 
ante, fixed and guaranteed payment commitments 
against an expected but uncertain future income stream 
from the underlying investment in the real sector to 
validate the payment of principal and interest stipulated 
in the debt contract. It is no wonder, then, that Keynes 
referred to such a system as a “casino”. 
 
The warning signs of such an eventual 
implosion had been around long before the recent crisis. 
Indeed, five years before the event, it was observed 
(Mirakhor, 2002) that: 
 
“While the financial innovations of the 1990s in 
the conventional system have led to 
mobilisation of financial resources in 
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astronomical proportions, they have also led to 
equally impressive growth of debt contracts 
and instruments. According to the latest 
reports, there are now US$32 trillion of 
sovereign and corporate bonds alone. 
Compare this (plus all other forms of debt, 
including consumer debt in industrial 
countries) to the production and capital base of 
the global economy, and one observes an 
inverted pyramid of huge debt piled up on a 
narrow production base that is supposed to 
generate income flows that are to serve this 
debt. In short, this growth in debt has nearly 
severed the relationship between finance and 
production. Analysts are now worried about a 
‘debt bubble’. For each dollar worth of 
production there are thousands of dollars of 
debt claims.” 
 
The succeeding five years made this picture far 
more ominous as debt grew further, its growth rate 
dwarfing the rate of expansion of the global production 
base. For example, by 2007, credit default swaps alone 
had grown in size to more than US$50 trillion, as 
compared to the total US GDP of US$14 trillion. 
 
 The view that a financial system dominated by 
credit and debt contracts is prone to instability and 
eventual collapse has been around since the 19th 
century. But its most respected intellectual pedigree 
dates to the years of the Great Depression when the 
view found forceful expression in the writings of eminent 
economists, such as Fisher and Simons (see Krichene 
and Mirakhor, 2008) in the United States and Keynes 
(1930, 1936 in the United Kingdom). The recognition that 
the fractional reserve banking system, in which credit 
multiplier and leverage ratio mechanisms were 
operative, was the source of credit instability led 
American economists, including Fisher and the Chicago 
Group (including Henry Simons, Frank Knight and other 
members of the economics faculty in the University of 
42 
Chicago), to propose the reform of the US banking 
system, to require banks to maintain reserves equal to 
100% of their deposits. While the proposal was not 
enacted into law (by some accounts, due to the political 
pressure of the banking lobby; see Phillips, 1995) at the 
time, it has resurfaced from time to time in a variety of 
formations, such as “narrow banking”, “collateralised 
banking” and others (see Bossone, 2002; Phillips, 1992a 
and 1992b, 1995; Konstas, 2006; Minsky, 1994; Pierce, 
1991; Spong, 1993; Scott, 1998; Garcia et. al., n.d; 
Wallace, 1996; Kobayakawa and Nakamura, 1999). The 
more recent discussion of 100% reserve banking 
proposals focuses on the moral hazard and costs of 
deposit insurance and lender of last resort functions, 
which central banks have to establish to cover deposits 
in the fractional reserve banking system in case of 
defaults, and on the advantage that the proposed reform 
will have in imposing discipline on credit creation within 
the system. 
 
 Whereas these American economists saw the 
fractional reserve banking system and its power of credit 
creation as a source of financial instability, Keynes saw 
another (deeper) “villain of the piece”: the role of interest 
and the rentiers who demanded it. Keynes saw this role 
as being so detrimental to the economy as to call for 
steps toward the “euthanasia of the rentier” in his book, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(1936). The issue of interest rate as rent was important 
enough to Keynes that he devoted a good part of the 
book to it (particularly in Chapters 12, 17 and 23, which 
are also among the most neglected chapters). A 
reputable economist whom no less than Joan Robinson 
called “a Keynesian” considers the notion of the 
“euthanasia of the rentier” among the 11 most important 
elements constituting the “classical Keynesian position”, 
as opposed to what Robinson called a “bastard 
Keynesian” position. By the latter, it is meant a system of 
economic thinking and policy that deviates profoundly 
from the views held by Keynes but which, nevertheless, 
its adherents refer to as “Keynesian” (Turgeon, 1996). 
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As important as the detrimental impact of an ex ante, 
fixed rate of interest on debt (particularly that which did 
not lead to investment) was to Keynes, it is puzzling and 
enigmatic, yet intriguing, that the economics profession 
has all but ignored this elemental concept of Keynesian 
thought. Even when a "Keynesian” does refer to this 
concept, the coverage tends to be superficial, historically 
as well as analytically. For example, consider Turgeon’s 
brief reference to this concept: 
 
“Some wag has defined an economist as 
someone who has seen something work in 
practice and then proceeds to make it work in 
theory. In some respects, this may have 
applied to Keynes, who was certainly aware of 
the tremendous economic miracle of Adolf 
Hitler in reducing unemployment from over 
30 percent when he took office in 1933 to 1 
percent by 1936, the year in which the German 
edition of the General Theory appeared.… 
One of the features of Hitler’s economy that 
also shows up in the General Theory is the 
neutralisation of monetary policy. Like other 
populists, Hitler had a special aversion to 
interest as a form of income since he 
considered this return to capital to be 
‘parasitic.’ Keynes in the General Theory has 
only a few references to monetary policy and, 
in one instance, he prescribed a lowering of 
interest rates in what we would later refer to as 
an overheated economy. He also prescribed 
the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ or the eventual 
elimination of real interest in a mature 
capitalist economy. Subsequently, Keynes’s 
disciple and early biographer, Sir Roy Hurrad, 
would also suggest the abandonment of 
interest as a category of income to pacify 
postwar socialists in Great Britain.” (Turgeon, 
1996) 
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The above remarks are analytically and 
historically wrong and a clear misrepresentation if 
intended to suggest, as the first sentence in the above 
quotation implies, that Keynes saw that Hitler’s 
repugnance to interest “worked in practice” and then 
proceeded “to make it work in theory”. The remarks also 
seem to make a vague suggestion of a timing 
coincidence between Hitler’s views on interest rates and 
those of Keynes. If this reading of the remarks is correct, 
it is historically off the mark by a wide margin. Historical 
evidence suggests that Keynes formulated his position 
on interest at least in the second half of the 1920s and 
presented it in his Treatise on Money, published in 1930, 
before Hitler appeared on the scene. Moreover, as will 
be seen, his views on interest and the rentier were the 
subject of a heated debate in the Economic Journal 
between 1931 and 1932, in which Keynes himself took 
part. Additionally, Keynes was not alone among British 
scholars in holding such views; nor were expressions of 
it confined to the 20th century (see, for example, 
Ferguson, 2008). The idea of a rentier–interest rate 
relation – that there is a class in market economies that 
lives on interest income and finds advantage in holding 
liquid assets rather than risking their holdings in 
employment-creating investment and would part with 
their liquidity only if they can loan it in the form of iron-
clad debt contracts that guarantee full repayment of the 
principal and interest – is an essential element in the 
explanation Keynes provides as to why a market 
economy left to itself will not create full employment. The 
rentier class will require a guaranteed ex ante specified 
rate of interest before parting with their liquid resources, 
which the entrepreneurs need to finance their 
employment-creating investment. It is then the 
entrepreneur who will have to determine if the expected 
rate of return from his investment (marginal efficiency of 
capital) is high enough to allow him to meet the 
demands of the rentier. There are two ways to remedy 
the situation: elimination of the rate of interest, or 
“euthanasia of the rentier”. Keynes chose the latter 
method, advocating a public policy that would socialise 
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capital investment combined with a low-interest policy. 
He believed that it was the scarcity of capital that gave 
the financial capital owners the power to extract a rent 
(interest) as a price for giving up their preference to hold 
their assets in liquid form. 
 
 A careful reading of the Treatise on Money and 
The General Theory makes clear that Keynes did not 
believe that there is either a theoretical explanation or an 
economic justification for the existence of an ex ante, 
fixed (or even variable) interest rate payment which 
(along with the principal) was guaranteed by a debt 
contract. His own liquidity preference theory explained 
why the rentiers were demanding an ex ante return on 
the money they would lend, rather than providing a 
justification (theoretic or economic) of the existence of 
such a rate. Nor has any theory emerged subsequently 
that can explain or justify such a rate as an integral part 
of a coherent economic model (see Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
1987). In fact, Keynes himself develops a theoretical 
edifice in terms of the concept of “own rate of interest” to 
suggest that any commodity in the spot market will have 
a rate of return in its term in the futures market, which 
may be zero, positive or negative, but most certainly not 
fixed ex ante as was the case of a rate of interest on 
money demanded by the rentier. Moreover, throughout 
his writings, Keynes emphasised that the future is 
uncertain – in the Knightian sense; an uncertainty not 
reducible to risk to be insured. In such a world, rates of 
return to assets could not be known ex ante. Whereas 
the marginal efficiency of capital (the rate of return on 
real sector investment) is determined within the real 
sector of the economy, an ex ante, fixed rate of interest 
on money is “determined by psychological and 
institutional conditions” (Keynes, 1936, pp. 202, 217).  
 
 While Keynes did not advocate outright 
elimination of the rate of interest by direct government 
intervention, he did consider that it is quite possible for 
the interest rate to converge to zero “within a single 
generation”, making “capital goods so abundant that the 
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marginal efficiency of capital is zero, this may be the 
most sensible way to gradually getting rid of many of the 
objectionable features of capitalism. For a little reflection 
will show what enormous social changes would result 
from a gradual disappearance of a rate of return on 
accumulated wealth…. Though the rentier would 
disappear, there would still be room, nevertheless, for 
enterprise and skill in the estimation of prospective yield 
about which opinions could differ. For the above relates 
primarily to the pure rate of interest apart from any 
allowance for risk and the like, and not to the gross yield 
of assets, including the return in respect of risk” (Keynes, 
1936, p. 221). Clearly, Keynes made a distinction 
between return to entrepreneurial and financial 
resources willing to take risk, which would be contingent 
on the outcome of the real sector investment undertaken 
by the entrepreneur and financed by the risk-taker, the 
surplus-fund holder, and an ex ante-determined rate of 
interest on money required by a rentier to part with 
liquidity. The latter he considered as “the villain of the 
piece”. 
 
 The Treatise on Money was published in 1930 
when economic deterioration was picking up momentum 
to become the Great Depression. Shortly after the book’s 
publication, a scholar by the name of H. Somerville 
published a short article in the December 1931 issue of 
the Economic Journal which prompted a debate on 
issues covered in the Treatise, including saving, 
investment, taxes, debt, credit, interest rate, usury, and 
scholastic thought. Somerville argued that “one of the 
unexpected consequences of Mr. Keynes is a vindication 
of the Canonist attitude to interest and usury”. By 
“Canonist”, Somerville was referring to a system of 
thought expounded by scholastic scholars (also called 
“Churchmen” or “Schoolmen”) of the Middle Ages who, 
in combining faith and reason, explained many religious 
precepts of Christianity. The most famous among these 
scholars was St. Thomas Aquinas. In his book History of 
Economic Analysis (1954), Joseph Schumpeter, after 
discussing the economic thoughts of the Greeks and 
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Romans, claimed that an intellectual gap of 500 years 
separated the contribution of Greco-Roman thought to 
economics and scholastic thought, which he referred to 
as “the Great Gap”. Schumpeter states that, as far as 
economics is concerned, “we may safely leap over 500 
years to the epoch of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) 
whose Summa Theologica is in the history of thought 
what the South-Western Spire of the Cathedral of 
Chartres is in the history of architecture” (pp. 73–74). In 
a paper presented in 1983, Mirakhor offered evidence 
that such a gap (great or otherwise) never existed. He 
traced the thoughts of scholastic scholars, to the Islamic 
world and its scholars, whose writings and thoughts were 
transmitted to the scholars of the Middle Ages via a 
variety of channels (see Mirakhor, 1983 reproduced in 
Al-Hassani and Mirakhor, 2003 for a fuller discussion). 
Among the economic thoughts of scholastics was the 
prohibition of interest charges on money loaned. By 
claiming that the position which Keynes took in his 
Treatise on the question of saving without investing, but 
demanding a reward anyway, vindicated the scholastic 
view on prohibition of interest, Somerville triggered the 
heated debate in the Economic Journal from December 
1931 to March 1932 when the Great Depression was in 
full swing. Particularly controversial was Somerville’s 
claim that: 
 
“It is an inescapable conclusion from the 
Keynesian analysis that interest is the villain of 
the economic piece. Not that Mr. Keynes 
suggests the possibility of abolition of interest. 
According to his theory, interest could be too 
low and might require to be raised in the 
general interest: this would be in 
circumstances when prices were advancing 
too rapidly. Leaving aside for a moment the old 
question whether interest is necessary to 
evoke saving, the only use that Mr. Keynes 
can see for interest is as a depressant in times 
of over-activity. 
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The orthodox doctrine has related interest 
closely to profits as if the two progressed or 
declined together. Mr. Keynes shows them as 
antagonists. Interest upon money is simply an 
added cost upon capital goods and therefore a 
deduction from profit and a burden upon 
enterprise. Socialist theory assails interest 
even more destructively than does Mr. 
Keynes, but socialist theory also assails profit, 
whereas Mr. Keynes salutes profit as the 
engine that drives the car of progress.” 
(Somerville, 1931, pp. 647–648) 
 
 It is worth noting that by the “orthodox doctrine”, 
Somerville does not mean the “Canonists” but the 
acceptable body of economic thought of his own day. 
The above remarks indicate that he is not a socialist, a 
popular school of thought of the time. He makes his own 
position clear: 
 
“The Cardinal point made by Mr. Keynes is the 
distinction between Saving and Investment, 
between the saving of money and its 
conversion into capital-goods. Saving without 
investment is not a service to production, and 
the saving of money does not by itself cause 
any conservation of products, but their waste, 
or their disposal at lower prices and the 
slowing down of productive activity…. From 
the point of view of general economy it might 
be better to spend on production than on 
consumption, but certainly the worst thing is 
the sterile saving of money. The saving is 
sterile from the stand point of community, 
though it may be profitable to the individual 
who, apart from any interest earnings, may 
watch his idle money grow in purchasing 
power through the fall in general prices. In 
such conditions, it is a matter to be deplored 
that holders of money are able to get interest 
by bank deposits. Interest only encourages 
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socially wasteful saving and discourages 
socially desirable investment. To this extent, 
therefore, and in such conditions, interest is 
anti-social. Mr. Keynes urges the lowering of 
interest, even the abolition of interest on bank 
deposits, as proper policy to be pursued when 
trade is below par.” (Somerville, 1931, p. 647) 
 
 Somerville also reiterated that the position of the 
Canonists on the impermissibility of interest as usury did 
not extend to profits earned as a result of risk-taking. 
This is the point of convergence of the views of the 
Canonists on interests and profits with those of Keynes. 
He stated that “the Canonists never quarreled with 
payments for use of capital, they raised no objection to 
true profit, the reward of risk, ability and enterprise, but 
they disputed the identification of the lending of money 
with the investment of capital and denied the justice of 
interest as a reward for saving without investment…. The 
Canonist principle was that sharing in trade risks made 
an investor a partner, a co-owner of capital, not simply a 
money lender, and gave a title to profit” (Somerville, 
1931, p. 648). To support his understanding of the 
scholastic position on interest and profit, Somerville 
referred to Ashley’s Economic History, one of the leading 
textbooks of the time on the subject (see Mirakhor, 
2003), particularly Book II of Ashley’s text, in which it is 
asserted that “until the beginning of the sixteenth century 
it was the constant teaching of the Canonists that to 
bargain for a fixed reward, or dividend, upon the capital 
invested, whatever the fortunes of business might be, 
made the contract usurious”. Somerville concluded his 
article by suggesting: 
 
“There may be reasons for thinking that the 
world will go back to the early Canonist 
doctrine. The classical argument that interest 
is necessary to evoke saving wears a different 
aspect when we appreciate that saving does 
not necessarily mean investment. The saving 
of money may actually diminish investment, 
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and interest is deterrent to investment. If we 
could ensure, as the Canonists tried to do, that 
saving should be rewarded only when it was 
also investment in capital-goods, we should 
have gone far to stop the master-evil that Mr. 
Keynes has revealed to us, of saving 
exceeding investment.” (Somerville, 1931, p. 
649) 
 
  Somerville’s potent argument that, based on his 
understanding of Keynes’s main thesis in the Treatise, 
the cause of underemployment and inherent instability in 
a money-capitalist system is the fact that in such a 
system, where debt contracts dominate investment 
financing, without government intervention, there is no 
way to guarantee equality of saving and investment, and 
that the interest rate is the mechanism responsible for 
this state of affairs, brought an immediate response. 
Three of the four papers published in the March 1932 
issue of The Economic Journal (by Edwin Cannan, B.P. 
Adarkar and B.K. Sandwell) under the heading: “Notes 
and Memoranda: Saving and Usury: A Symposium”, 
were highly critical of Somerville, accusing him of: 
misunderstanding, either the Canonists’ position or that 
of Keynes, or both; of “misconceptions” of saving and 
investment; and of “hostility to personal ownership” (pp. 
123–135). The fourth, and last, paper was by Keynes 
himself (Keynes, 1932, pp. 135–137) who was 
supportive of Somerville, both in the latter’s 
understanding and presentation of Keynes’s arguments 
in the Treatise as well as in the position of the Canonists. 
Keynes’s article primarily focuses on Edwin Cannan’s 
article, saying: 
 
“… Prof. Cannan agrees with Mr. Somerville 
that if saving is conceived as mere refraining 
from expenditure, or if it is conceived as saving 
up money, ‘the case against interest as a 
consequence of saving is black.’ But, he 
continues, ‘the answer is that interest is not, in 
fact, obtained as a consequence of saving in 
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either of these two senses. No one gets a 
penny of interest in consequence of merely 
refraining from expenditure; no one gets a 
penny of interest in consequence of having 
merely saved up money.’ I wish I could agree 
with him in attributing this natural justice to the 
economic system, but I am sure it is not so. 
Prof. Cannan has, I think, overlooked a vital 
aspect of the argument in my Treatise on 
Money wherein it differs from what I was 
brought up to believe and continued to believe 
until recently. 
 
The point is this. The answer to the 
question whether there is an increment of 
wealth corresponding to the saving of an 
individual seldom depends, as Prof. Cannan 
claims, on what he does with the money which 
represents that part of income which he 
refrains from spending on current 
consumption. In particular, the answer does 
not depend, as Prof. Cannan seems to 
suggest, on whether he ‘hoards’ the money by 
increasing his cash or uses it to buy a security 
or some other capital asset. He may use his 
savings to buy a bond, and yet there may be 
no increment of capital wealth coming into 
existence as a result of his saving. I have 
argued in my Treatise that the causes which 
determine the increment of capital wealth are 
only contingently and indirectly connected with 
those which determine the amount of 
individual savings. If an increment of saving by 
an individual is not accompanied by an 
increment of new investment – and, in the 
absence of deliberate management by the 
Central Bank or the Government, it will be 
nothing but a lucky accident if it is … then it 
necessarily causes diminished receipts, 
disappointment and losses to the other party, 
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and the outlet for savings of A will be found in 
financing losses of B. 
 
Thus, when an individual saves, his savings 
must be balanced by the creation of either of 
an asset or a debt (or a loss paid for by an 
asset changing hands). But, as a rule, it lies 
entirely outside the power of the individual 
saver to determine which it is to be, and 
whether the result, or rather the 
accompaniment, of his saving is to be an asset 
or a debt. What he has done is to make 
possible the creation of an asset without a rise 
in price-level. But failing a simultaneous 
increment of new investment, either by good 
management or by a lucky accident, then his 
act of saving will cause an equal loss to 
someone else; a debt will be created or an 
asset will change hands, but there will be no 
increment of wealth. 
Does Prof. Cannan hold that if an individual 
increases his bank-deposit by ‘saving up’ 
money out of income, there necessarily results 
an increment of wealth to the community? If 
so, this is a view with which I have tried to join 
issue in my Treatise on Money; if not, he has 
failed to meet the point. 
 
Now when an act of saving merely results, 
however unintentionally, in a loss to someone 
else, it is of an anti-social tendency, and the 
subsequent payment of interest to the saver – 
for a pace Prof. Cannan, debts have to pay 
interest just as much as assets – is a burden 
which, if accumulated with time, may become 
insupportable. 
 
That is why, without contesting anything in Mr. 
Adarkar’s note, I nevertheless agree with Mr. 
Somerville that it is this social evil, to the 
possibility and theoretical explanation of which 
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I drew attention in my Treatise, which probably 
lay behind the doctrine of the Canonists.” 
(Keynes, 1932, pp. 135–136) 
 
 The implication is clear: it is interest-debt that is a 
“social evil” and the “villain of the piece” of the 
explanation for unemployment, fragility and, ultimately, 
the inherent instability of debt-based financial capitalism. 
Without the institution of interest, unspent income would 
find its way to investment in exchange for a reward 
contingent on the outcome of the real sector investment, 
for which savings provided the financing. Emboldened 
by the support his views received from Keynes, 
Somerville produced another note for the June 1932 
issue of the Economic Journal, in which he mounted a 
well-argued attack on the institution of interest. The 
centrepiece of this note focused on the fact that the 
economics profession had not produced a satisfactory 
theory or explanation of why an ex ante, fixed interest 
had to be paid on debt. One by one, Somerville refuted 
the existing explanations and restated the Canonists’ 
position on usury, again demonstrating the convergence 
of this view with that of Keynes with considerably more 
clarity: 
 
“Canonist legislation prohibited all interest … 
but freely allowed profits even to sleeping 
partners.… Interest was forbidden, while profit 
was allowed, because interest arose simply 
from a loan of money and profit from an 
investment of capital.… In striking at interest 
on money loans, the Canonists were striking at 
saving-without-investment apart from that 
which consists in the simple hoarding of 
currency. At the same time, they were 
positively encouraging, both by their 
prohibition of interest and their allowance of 
profit, investment in the sense of the 
production of capital goods.… 
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Money-lending without investment was 
recognised practically and theoretically as a 
social evil in the fourteenth century. Mr. 
Keynes’s ‘Saving without Investment’ is 
correctly translated as money-lending without 
investment, it being understood that savings 
deposits are regarded as lending.… The 
lending of money necessarily involves a debt, 
and it never by itself constitutes an asset.… 
The great support which Mr. Keynes gives to 
the Canonists, I take to be this: his strong 
distinction between saving and investment 
shows that it is theoretically wrong to treat 
money as representative capital and lending 
as investment. Interest is the price paid for the 
use of money, it is not the yield of capital.” 
(Somerville, 1932, pp. 322–323) 
 
 Keynes went on to expound his ideas on issues 
raised in the Economic Journal Symposium in his 
General Theory with greater clarity. Toward the end of 
his book (Chapter 23), he makes the following remarks 
regarding the Canonists’ position on usury: 
 
“I was brought up to believe that the attitude of 
the Medieval Church to the rate of interest was 
inherently absurd, and that the subtle 
discussions aimed at distinguishing the return 
on money-loans from the return to active 
investment were merely Jesuitical attempts to 
find a practical escape from a foolish theory. 
But I now read these discussions as an honest 
intellectual effort to keep separate what the 
classical theory has inextricably confused 
together, namely the rate of interest and the 
marginal efficiency of capital. For it now seems 
clear that the disquisitions of the schoolmen 
were directed towards the elucidation of a 
formula which should allow the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital to be high, whilst  
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using rule and custom and the moral law to 
keep down the rate of interest.” (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 352) 
 
 These remarks seem to validate Somerville’s 
conception of convergence between the views of 
scholastic scholars on interest and profit and those of 
Keynes. Be that as it may, in the General Theory Keynes 
makes the point forcefully that the interest rate, through 
its role in creating a wedge between saving and 
investment, creates conditions under which the system 
becomes inherently unstable. In his concluding remarks 
(Chapter 24), Keynes suggests: 
 
“I feel sure that the demand for capital is 
strictly limited in the sense that it would not be 
difficult to increase the stock of capital up to a 
point where its marginal efficiency had fallen to 
a very low figure. This would not mean that the 
use of capital instruments would cost nothing, 
but only that the return from them would have 
to cover little more than their exhaustion by 
wastage and obsolescence, together with 
some margin to cover risk and the exercise of 
skill and judgment…. Now, though this state of 
affairs would be quite compatible with some 
measure of individualism, yet it would mean 
the euthanasia of the rentier, and, 
consequently, the euthanasia of the 
cumulative oppressive power of capitalist to 
exploit the scarcity value of capital. Interest 
today rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more 
than does the rent of land.… But whilst there 
may be intrinsic reasons for the scarcity of 
land, there are no intrinsic reasons for the 
scarcity.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 376) 
 
He viewed the “euthanasia of the rentier” as a 
gradual process, one that “will need no revolution”. This 
will happen when “a somewhat comprehensive 
socialisation of investment will prove the only means of 
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securing an approximation to full employment; though 
this need not exclude all manner of compromises and 
devices by which public authority will co-operate with 
private initiative” (Keynes, 1936, p. 378). Thus, there 
would be “an increase in the volume of capital until it 
ceases to be scarce, so that the functionless investor will 
no longer receive a bonus…” (Keynes, 1936, p. 376). 
 
 Keynes believed that financial capitalism, left to its 
own devices, is inherently unstable. At the core of this 
belief are the real phenomena of saving and investment 
processes. Coming basically from two different sub-
sectors of the real economy, consumer and business, 
their coordinated behaviour is subject to uncertainty. 
That even under the best of circumstances their equality 
is not always assured, is at the core of his explanation of 
the inherent instability of the system. The existence of a 
financial system dominated by ex ante, fixed interest-
based debt contracts makes achieving sustained full 
employment equilibrium difficult if not impossible. The 
essence of Keynes’s prescription for achieving stability 
and full employment in such an economy was 
socialisation of capital investment, which would allow 
diminished scarcity of capital and the eventual 
“euthanasia of the rentier”, to ensure that all savings 
would be channelled to productive employment-creating 
investment. In Chapter 24 of his General Theory, Keynes 
argued that interest rewards no genuine sacrifice, and 
that its compounding, which leads to wealth 
accumulation at an accelerated pace, ensures that 
wealth and income distribution in society is tilted toward 
the rentier. The end result is unemployment, poverty and 
deprivation. Thus, he argued that the chief “evils” of 
modern financial capitalism were its inability to provide 
full employment and its strong tendency to generate an 
arbitrary and inequitable distribution of income and 
wealth. Through his call for the “euthanasia of the 
rentier”, he linked both these “evils” to their underlying 
mutual cause: the institution of interest. 
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 One of the most perceptive, productive and 
brilliant followers of Keynes was Hyman Minsky who 
pushed forward the frontiers of “the classical Keynesian” 
(as opposed to “bastard Keynsian”) thought to produce 
valuable insights into the workings of the financial 
capitalist system. As did Keynes before him, Minsky 
considered such a system inherently unstable, holding 
that if the financial system is dominated by ex ante, fixed 
interest-based debt contracts, the structure itself 
becomes a source of amplification of disturbances. His 
major contribution is known as the “financial instability 
hypothesis” (Krichene and Mirakhor, 2008; Mirakhor, 
1985). This hypothesis contains two main propositions; 
the first states that there are two financing structures: 
one promotes stability, the other instability. The second 
proposition states that, in the financial system of money 
capitalism, stability is not sustainable because, during 
prosperity, stability contains the seeds of its own 
instability. Minsky referred to this proposition as “stability 
is destabilising”. A simple rendition of the first proposition 
is to say that the more a financial structure (debt-to-
equity ratio) tilts toward debt, the greater the fragility of 
the system. This is what happens, according to Minsky, 
to the financial structure of the economy through time. In 
a period of prosperity, there are large payoffs to 
borrowing used to finance activity in areas and sectors of 
the economy with profitable opportunities. Initially, 
businesses are conservative and finance their activities 
through equity finance and/or from their own internal 
funds. And, if they borrow, they do so only if their future 
income streams are sufficient for them to meet the 
payment commitment stream (principal and interest) 
over the lifetime of the contracted debt. Minsky calls this 
“hedge finance”. The financial system dominated by this 
type of financing (mostly equity and internal funds, with 
some debt commitments that are validated comfortably 
by an underlying income stream) is consistent with 
stability. However, as profit opportunities intensify during 
prosperity, there is higher reward to borrowing as 
enterprises take greater risks. Thus, more and more 
firms and other participants tilt their financial structure 
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toward debt and increased leverage, and become 
“speculative” units. That is in response to what they see 
as profitable opportunities and in expectations of 
exploiting them. These firms overwhelm the financial 
structure with debt, to the point where their income 
stream becomes insufficient to pay the principal. 
Although speculative units pay interest when due, they 
have to rollover the principal at maturity. According to 
Minsky, matters do not rest here. Firms continue to 
borrow to the point where their financial structure is 
made of debt commitments that can be validated by 
more borrowing to pay both principal and interest. 
Minsky referred to these units as “ponzi units” and to 
their financing as “ponzi finance”. He believed that 
during the prosperity phase of a business cycle, 
capitalist economies tend to become progressively more 
fragile as their financial structure changes from hedge 
(little or no debt) to speculative and ponzi finance 
(Minsky, 1986). 
 
 The pivotal element of Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis is debt. So important is this 
element that Minsky considered his hypothesis as a 
“theory of the impact of debt on system behavior”. There 
are two forces that push debt financing to higher and 
higher levels in the upward phase of the cycle. First, 
market participants borrow more and more because 
asset price increases validate their expectations, which 
undergirded their increased borrowing in the first place. 
Moreover, as prices increase, the value of their collateral 
increases and with it their creditworthiness, allowing 
them to borrow more. Second, banks and other highly 
leveraged financial institutions expand credit and push 
lending in two ways: (i) as prices of assets increase, their 
balance sheets expand, allowing them to extend more 
credit; and (ii) they find new ways and means of credit 
expansion through financial innovation. These financial 
intermediaries are, after all, what Minsky called 
“merchants of debt”. They are constantly searching for 
ways and means of expanding their balance sheets. 
Thus, the debt structure continues to be extended 
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throughout the financial system and beyond to the whole 
economy. 
 
 Minsky was one of the most astute students and 
observers of capitalism. He saw it as a dynamic system 
that is constantly evolving. Within it there are a number 
of dialectical processes and feedback loops at work that 
made issues of instability, unfair distribution and 
unemployment structural problems of the system. In this 
he was following Keynes. And, like Keynes, he thought 
the dialectic forces within the system would lead it into 
disaster if the system were left to its own devices. There 
were ways in which the system could be stabilised – for 
instance, Minsky believed the solution was a “Big 
Government”; big enough so that its expenditure would 
be a stabilising force and serve as an “employer of last 
resort” and a “Big Central Bank” to serve as an effective 
lender of last resort. Additionally, Minsky called for a 
dynamic regulatory system that would be constantly 
ahead of the curve to minimise the likelihood of 
regulatory arbitrage (see Minsky, 1986). 
 
 In the aftermath of the recent crisis, many have 
found Minsky’s diagnoses of past crises, and his 
explanations of potential turbulences that he foresaw 
ahead, to be insightful and enlightening, as he had 
warned of growing fragility in the system, debt buildup in 
the household and business sectors, and the adverse 
potential of securitisation, debt globalisation and wrong-
headed government policies. He had placed great stress 
on the adverse impact of ongoing ideologically-based 
deregulation that began in the early 1980s. A number of 
his colleagues, former students, and followers carried on 
this tradition after his death in 1996, analysing the 
unfolding events in the financial sector using his financial 
instability hypothesis. In a number of papers, published 
between 1996 and when the crisis hit, these scholars 
warned of an impending disaster as they observed the 
growing debt and fragility in the system. (For these 
papers, see various working papers and policy briefs of 
The Levy Economics Institute of Brad College, available 
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on line.) They saw the phenomenon of bubbles forming, 
inflating and bursting not as an isolated incidence and as 
due to external factors, but as “rolling bubbles” – 
symptoms of growing financial fragility that would 
eventually lead to full instability. (Soros, too, had seen 
each bubble as being part of a “super bubble” of growing 
debt and credit – Soros, 2008.) Minsky had observed the 
growing fragility of the US financial system since 1966, 
where a bubble’s boom and bust in one asset market 
was followed by the formation and implosion of another 
bubble in a different asset market. These booms and 
busts saw major players fail and have to be bailed out by 
the government. . They included the emerging market 
debt crisis, and the LTCM, dotcom, housing and 
commodities bubbles. Just as financialisation would help 
to create one asset market after another, expanding 
liquidity and credit in search of yield would create one 
bubble after another. In the aftermath of the recent crisis, 
a number of Minsky’s colleagues and students have 
analysed these events using his framework (see 
Whalen, 2008; Wray, 2008a and 2008b).  
 
 
IV.  The Islamic Financial System and Lessons of the 
Recent Crisis 
 
Over the past few decades, a consensus emerged that 
expansion of credit and debt is detrimental to the stability 
of developing economies. For example, the IMF advised 
its developing country members that in order to mitigate 
the risk of instability, such as occurred in the emerging 
markets in 1997, they should: (i) avoid debt-creating 
flows; (ii) rely mostly on foreign direct investment as 
external financing; (iii) if they must borrow, ensure that 
their external debt is never larger than 25% of GDP and 
that their debt obligations are not bunched toward the 
short end of maturities; (iv) ensure that their economy is 
producing large enough primary surpluses to meet their 
debt obligations; (v) ensure that their sovereign bonds 
incorporate clauses (such as majority action, initiation 
and engagement clauses) that make debt workouts and 
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restructurings easier – that is, to ensure that there exist 
better risk-sharing mechanisms associated with their 
debt obligations to avoid moral hazard; (vi) ensure that 
domestic corporations have transparent balance sheets, 
follow marked-to-market accounting, and have financial 
structures that are biased more heavily toward equity 
and internal funding and are not heavily leveraged; and 
(vii) ensure that their domestic financial institutions are 
regulated and supervised efficiently, are not highly 
leveraged, follow prudent credit policy and are highly 
transparent. The IMF strongly prescribed periodic audit 
of the soundness and stability of the financial sector of 
its members’ economies. While a majority of the 
members complied, some of its major shareholders, 
notably the United States, repeatedly refused such 
diagnostic audits. The financial crisis has proved that 
major countries are in need of IMF financial policy 
prescription as much as, if not more than, developing 
countries. 
 
 Be that as it may, it is now clear that financial 
systems dominated by interest-based debt contracts are 
prone to financial fragility and instability. Nevertheless, 
other than Keynes and his most ardent followers, few, if 
any, notable economists have proposed outright 
elimination of ex ante, fixed interest-based debt 
contracts in practice. Theoretically, however, the 
workings of such debtless systems have been 
investigated in the form of theoretically modelled 
systems, such as pure “stock market” economies and 
“cash-in-advance” systems, to analyse their implications. 
One of the earliest analytically elegant models of a stock 
market economy was developed by Lloyd Metzler 
(1951), who investigated the economic implications of an 
economic system in which private wealth is in only two 
forms: “money (including demand deposits) and common 
stock, and that all common stock involves appropriately 
the same degree of risk”. Metzler further assumed that 
the central bank is legally authorised to buy and sell the 
common stock held by the owners of private equity and 
that this common stock constitutes the only non-
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monetary asset of the banking system. The Metzler 
model further assumed a closed economy, a fixed labour 
supply, and that all means of production, other than 
labour, were produced at constant returns to scale. With 
these assumptions, Metzler defined a “rate of interest” as 
“nothing more than the yield of the stock, and this yield, 
in turn, is the ratio of the income earned by the stock to 
its market price” (Metzler, 1951). It is clear that this “rate 
of interest” is not the same as the customary ex ante, 
fixed interest rate on borrowed money stipulated in a 
debt contract. For one thing, Metzler’s “interest rate” is 
determined by the earnings and price of the stock, 
clearly an ex post concept. Second, unlike the 
customary ex ante-fixed interest rate debt-contract  
where total interest paid is tied to the amount of money 
loaned, Metzler’s interest rate was based on the 
performance of the stock in the market and the earnings 
from the investment activity that issued the stock; again, 
an ex post, rather than an ex ante concept. Metzler then 
proceeded to drive the equilibrium conditions for such a 
system and investigate its stability characteristics. 
 
 Sensing that Metzler’s model was a reasonable 
first approximation of an Islamic financial structure, since 
it assumed away the existence of debt instruments, 
Mohsin Khan (1986) constructed a simple version of the 
Metzler model to demonstrate its equilibrium. He showed 
that the system produces a saddle point – that is, the 
equilibrium is stable. Khan then suggests that: 
 
“Based on principles of equity participation, 
Islamic banking may well prove  to be better 
suited to adjusting to shocks that result in 
banking crises and disruption of the payment 
mechanism of the country. In an equity-based 
system that excludes predetermined interest 
rates and does not guarantee the nominal 
value of deposits, shocks to asset positions 
are immediately absorbed by changes in the 
value of shares (deposits) held by the public in 
the bank[;] therefore, the real values of assets 
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and liabilities of banks in such a system would 
be equal at all points in time.” (Khan, 1986) 
 
Khan and Mirakhor (1989) structured a different 
model to show that in such a system, monetary policy is 
not impaired. Both these models were closed-economy 
models. Zaidi and Mirakhor (1988) constructed an open-
economy general equilibrium model to investigate the 
implications of operation of an Islamic financial system, 
particularly the effects on the economy’s capacity to 
adjust to disturbances, and on international capital flows. 
It concluded that monetary policy is effective for 
stabilisation purposes and that disturbances to asset 
positions are absorbed efficiently in an Islamic financial 
system. These models focused on the financial sector 
without directly involving the real sector of the economy. 
Mirakhor (1990) constructed a model that incorporated 
some of the characteristics of the above models and 
features of some well-known models, as well as insights 
by researchers who had extended Metzler’s model in 
new directions. The latter research work had 
demonstrated that a fully equity-based system has 
desirable features that improve the shock-absorption 
adjustment capacity of the economy; that is, such a 
system is more stable than a debt-based system, as it 
adjusts rapidly to shocks (see, for example, Shane, 
1984; Cole, 1988). Like the Metzler–Khan model, the 
model in Mirakhor’s paper assumed only two assets: 
money and shares; but unlike the former model, where 
the rate of return was given as the ratio of the return to 
stock and its market price, Mirakhor’s model derived a 
rate of return from the real sector, thus providing an 
interactive process between the financial sector and the 
real sector which provided the rate of return to the former 
sector. The equilibrium conditions in the short and long 
run for both closed- and open-economy models were 
derived. The paper then investigated the stability of the 
equilibrium and the process of adjustment of the system 
to shocks. 
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In summary, standard economic analysis can 
demonstrate the stability of an Islamic financial system 
and its resilience to shocks, at least in theory. The 
intuition behind this conclusion is that, unlike a debt-
based system, there is a one-to-one mapping of the 
financial structure onto the underlying real sector assets. 
There is neither the problem of mismatching household 
savings and finance for investment, nor of mismatching 
maturities. Risks of loss are shared between the surplus 
fund holder and the entrepreneur. There is no 
opportunity to expand credit and leverage beyond what 
can be supported by the real sector output (Krichene 
and Mirakhor, 2008). It has already been remarked that, 
as conventional analysis has demonstrated, the 
informational problems that are characteristic of debt-
based system do not exist in the case of share contracts; 
thus, risk-sharing, equity-based financing is more 
efficient. All of this has been demonstrated by standard 
analysis in a conventional system. But each financial 
system operates within an institutional framework that 
facilitates its efficient operations. If the elements of that 
framework are impaired, the efficiency of the system is 
adversely impacted. The stability characteristics 
demonstrated by the above-mentioned theoretical 
papers are generated within a conventional institutional 
framework. Even so, the superior stability characteristics 
of a non-interest-based equity system, as compared to 
an interest-based debt system, have been 
demonstrated. Scholars, some of whose works were 
briefly reviewed above, have argued that it is the 
predominance of debt that is responsible for the inherent 
instability of a debt-based market economy. The point is 
that it is possible – at least theoretically – to envision a 
non-interest-based financial structure within a 
conventional system. What makes for a truly Islamic 
system, however, is not only the prohibition of interest 
(although this is an important element of the system), but 
the institutional framework within which the system has 
to operate. Without its institutional underpinnings – a 
platform of behavioural rules – Islamic finance becomes 
indistinguishable from a conventional system, with 
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financing being provided through sharing, rather than 
debt contracts. 
 
The institutional framework – what Douglass 
North calls the institutional scaffolding – that Islam 
provides for the operation of its economic and financial 
system strengthens considerably the stability of the 
system. The elements of this “scaffolding” come directly 
from the Qur’an, with additional explication and 
operationalisation from the Sunnah of the Messenger 
This framework includes, inter alia, 
sanctity of contract (explicit and implicit); property rights; 
trust; rules of behaviour in governance; existence of 
markets; rules regarding the allocation, production and 
distribution of resources, income and wealth; rules 
governing the behaviour of market participants; and 
rules regarding post-market distribution. (See Mirakhor, 
2007, Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; and Askari et. al., 2009, 
for a more detailed discussion of the elements of the 
institutional framework of Islam.) There can be little 
doubt that with such a strongly rules-based framework 
based on faithfulness to contracts and a strong 
prohibition against taking interest, lying, cheating and 
other fraudulent activities, the financial system of Islam 
would be transparent, efficient and informationally 
trouble-free. For example, consider the implications of 
full operationalisation of only one element of Islam’s 
institutional scaffolding – that is, the first verse of 
Chapter 5 of the Qur’an: the rule of faithfully abiding by 
the terms and conditions stipulated by a contract to 
which one is a party. Its full implications are nothing 
short of astounding. No one would need fear that a 
contract would not be performed as a result of lying, 
cheating, fraud or negligence. Imagine the efficiency 
gains in such a system; there would be no monitoring 
costs, no risk of moral hazard or adverse selection, and 
a minimal cost of transaction in contracting. 
 
While there are many whose behaviour 
corresponds to the rules specified by the institutional 
framework of Islam, the scaffolding in its entirety is not 
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yet fully in place in Muslim countries. Until such time as 
Islamic rules of behaviour are fully operationalised, the 
available institutional framework in Muslim societies will 
have to be organised to ensure that non-correspondence 
of actual behaviours in society with those expected by 
Islam does not create damaging distortions, dislocations 
and exploitations that harm the welfare of the members 
of the society. It is in this context that the recent crisis 
holds valuable lessons for Islamic finance. As discussed 
earlier, there are two explanations of how the crisis 
developed. One view holds that crises are endemic to a 
financial system that is debt denominated, and where 
contracts are made on the basis of money now for 
money later without much consideration of relations to 
activities in the real sector. Such a system creates an 
incentive structure for the rapid expansion of credit and 
debt, through leverage, and the emergence of asset 
price bubbles. As market players in such a system, 
financial institutions are “merchants of debt”. As rising 
asset market prices validate round after round of rising 
profit expectations, these “merchants of debt” are 
encouraged to increase leverage, through financial 
innovation, expand credit and, in turn, encourage their 
clients to tilt their financial structure ever more toward 
debt, thus making it more and more fragile. When asset 
market prices reach a limit of increase and interest rates 
rise for fear of inflation, some of these debt obligations 
are not validated. Because of the complexity and 
interrelated nature of financial markets, failures to 
validate a few large debt payment obligations create a 
rapid contagion effect as more and more portfolios in the 
market become contaminated. As Soros has observed, 
bubbles have a built-in asymmetric nature. It takes a lot 
longer for them to emerge, but they implode in short 
order. As the authorities bail out major participants from 
the disastrous impact of one asset market bubble 
implosion, creating lower interest rates to minimise the 
impact on the real economy and on other asset markets, 
and higher liquidity, innovations create new asset 
classes to which liquidity in search of yield migrates. The 
result is a “rolling bubble”, except that each bubble is 
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larger and packs a greater force than the one before it. 
Soros suggests the emergence of an immensely sized 
“super bubble” within which smaller bubbles are created 
and then busted. Such was the case in the US financial 
system as bubbles rolled from emerging markets debt, to 
the dotcom, real estate and commodities markets. At 
each turn, bailouts, low interest rates, inflow of funds 
from emerging markets and financial innovations created 
a powerful source of funds in search of yield, which 
poured into new asset classes. The first view holds that 
these results were predictable and predicted, as financial 
fragility (greater reliance on debt) was reinforced. It holds 
that the “ideologically-based aversion to regulation” that 
prompted the “deregulation revolution” of the last 
quarter-century in the United States, as well as in other 
advanced economies, created an incentive structure for 
accelerating the rapidly paced, debt-based financial 
innovations which, in turn, were powerful stimulants to 
the emergence of consumer–business debt binges. 
 
The more conventional view, on the other hand, 
tends to downplay the idea of “super bubbles” and 
“rolling bubbles”, as well as the thesis of the inherent 
instability of a debt-based financial system. It treats 
bubbles in isolation, each having different reasons for its 
emergence, but due mostly to the “irrational exuberance” 
of market players. It further holds that bubbles cannot be 
predicted; therefore, attempts by policy to target rising 
prices in a given asset market may have an adverse 
impact on economic growth. Moreover, this view argues 
that risk-taking is an essential element of the dynamism 
of a market economy. Therefore, too much regulation 
that thwarts risk-taking will harm economic growth. 
Financial innovations are to be welcomed not only 
because they are necessary to the dynamics of risk-
taking but also because they help in the process of 
completion of markets and, thus, increase efficiency. 
Asset price increases are a natural response of the 
market to investment opportunities, and bubbles are the 
result of an overly exuberant response of market 
participants to profit opportunities. (Sooner or later, 
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market forces will dampen the over-exuberance and 
bubbles will disappear.) As indicated earlier, the former 
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve was one policy-
maker who espoused such a view, although he recently 
admitted that it was based on a faulty theoretical model. 
 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
The major lesson of the recent crisis for Islamic finance, 
especially at this juncture in its evolution, is the need for 
the design and development of a comprehensive and 
dynamic regulatory-prudential-supervisory framework, 
uniquely and properly designed for an Islamic financial 
system. Such a framework will satisfy the requirements 
of any existing regulatory framework anywhere in the 
world, and go beyond them to ensure the stability of the 
system. Theory has demonstrated the stability of an 
equity-based, risk-sharing financial system. Moreover, 
theory can also demonstrate, easily and comfortably, 
that the institutional framework (rules of behaviour) of 
Islam, within which its financial system must operate, 
reinforces to a high degree the stability and efficiency of 
the financial system. In practice, however, and as long 
as the institutional framework is not fully in place, an 
Islamic financial system can fall victim to the same 
adversely designed incentive structure as the 
conventional system, particularly because Islamic 
finance is presently operating in an institutional 
framework which is basically that of the conventional 
system. Mere declaration of prohibition of ex ante, fixed 
interest-based debt contracts by fiat, but without any 
effort at implementation of the supporting institutional 
framework, will not accrue the benefits of properly 
structured Islamic finance to the population; indeed, it 
may do harm by creating a sense of complacency in the 
society. Creating a non-interest-based system side-by-
side with a conventional system within an institutional 
framework that is basically designed to support the latter 
system has benefits and costs. Which of the two 
dominates is an empirical question. However, from pure 
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intuition, the benefits would seem to overwhelm the 
costs in the long run when all possible benefits are 
considered, as it allows an orderly evolution of Islamic 
finance. 
 
In either case, a properly designed regulatory-
prudential-supervisory framework seems essential to the 
orderly development and evolution of Islamic finance. 
Such a framework will have to be uniquely designed to 
distinguish it from that of a conventional system, in that it 
has to structure its incentive system to include both 
negative elements (don’ts) that specify prohibited 
behaviour, and positive elements (dos) that encourage 
and enforce recommended behaviour. Such a 
framework will have to be comprehensive, covering all 
transactions, and all financial instruments and institutions 
operating in the system, without exception. One of the 
most damaging elements of the US regulatory system 
was that a larger segment of the financial markets and 
institutions had little or no regulatory-prudential-
supervisory oversight. Moreover, the regulatory 
framework was fragmented. In an Islamic financial 
system there are no interest-based debt contracts; 
financial innovation can proceed only as it relates to 
equity and trade-based transactions (both of which areas 
provide ample opportunity for financial engineering). 
Nevertheless, the risk of inappropriate, ostensibly trade- 
or equity-based, but actually debt-like, instruments that 
are highly collateralised to enhance their credit rating 
cannot be minimised. The soundness and 
appropriateness of some of the reverse-engineered 
financial instruments innovated in recent years have 
been questionable (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Mirakhor 
and Zaidi, 2007; Chapra, 2007; Hassan and Lewis, 
2007; Siddiqi, 2007). It is the responsibility of an 
appropriately designed regulatory oversight to ensure 
that such risks are mitigated. Moreover, such a 
framework will have to be unified under one regulatory 
umbrella. The artificial segmentation of the financial 
markets into money and capital markets for regulatory 
purposes was one of the most damaging aspects of the 
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regulatory framework in the United States, in which the 
regulatory authority was segmented between various 
agencies – the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of 
Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
– the states and their regulatory apparatus, and the 
commodities market with its regulatory-supervisory rules. 
Given the rapidly paced financial innovation, the line of 
demarcation between money markets, capital markets 
and all sorts of financial asset markets is blurred. In an 
Islamic financial system, the segmentation of regulatory 
authority is even less logical because of the nature of a 
system that promotes nearly a one-to-one interaction 
between real sector and finance activities. 
 
The properly designed regulatory oversight for 
Islamic finance will have to be uniform – that is, its 
standards must apply uniformly to all Islamic financial 
institutions, transactions and instruments everywhere, 
globally across all jurisdictions; the reason being that the 
systemic risk of a failure of one Islamic financial 
institution or instrument is far greater for Islamic finance 
than for its conventional counterpart because of the 
potentially magnified reputational damage for the entire 
system, particularly at this juncture of the evolution of 
Islamic finance. Because profit-seeking motivation 
currently drives financial-sector innovations, there are 
strong incentives to create instruments and ways and 
means of regulatory arbitrage. An appropriately 
designed regulatory framework for Islamic finance will 
have to have sufficient built-in flexibility and dynamism to 
allow it to stay ahead of the innovation curve, in order to 
minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage. An 
appropriately designed, unified, uniform-comprehensive 
framework, administered globally, requires a universal 
mandate to enforce its rules and standards everywhere. 
Such a mandate requires all governments in countries 
where Islamic finance is in operation to extend such a 
mandate to the unified global regulatory agency for the 
development of oversight standards of Islamic financial 
institutions, transactions and instruments. Given the 
design and implementation of such a framework, even 
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governments of non-Islamic countries where Islamic 
finance operates should have no difficulty with such a 
mandate because they, too, are primarily concerned with 
the safety and security of all financial institutions 
operating within their borders. No less an ardent 
supporter of free markets than Lionel Robbins once 
remarked that “the pursuit of self-interest, unrestrained 
by suitable institutions, carries no guarantee of anything 
but chaos” (Robbins, 1952). A regulatory framework is 
the most important of “suitable institutions”. While 
important in the conventional system, it is crucial for an 
Islamic financial system at this nascent stage of its 
development because of the heavy costs of 
materialisation of reputational and systemic risks of the 
failure of a few, or even one, Islamic financial institution 
or instrument, given the present sensitivities.  
 
Consequently, the most important lesson of the 
recent crisis for Islamic finance is an urgent need for the 
design, development and implementation of a 
comprehensive, unified, uniform, global and dynamic 
regulatory-prudential-supervisory framework. Such a 
framework of standards needs a unified administrative 
agency to uniformly and globally enforce the rules of the 
framework across jurisdictional boundaries. This requires 
the agency to have a legislatively based mandate to enforce 
implementation of its standards and oversight rules. Clearly, 
this is a most serious challenge, but one that must be met 
because, at the present stage of development, Islamic 
finance is embedded in an institutional framework designed 
to support a conventional financial system and in which 
innovations replicate instruments designed for a 
conventional system through “reverse engineering”. In such 
a system, there is no assurance that financial bubbles and 
their boom and bust cycles can be avoided. Because the 
materialisation of such events has significant reputational 
risk for Islamic finance, to a degree that may abort its further 
development, the design and implementation of an 
appropriate regulatory framework, as described above, is 
urgently needed. 
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